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ABSTRACT 
 
The general objective of this research was to assess transaction cost determinants of 
credit governance structure of commercial banks in Tanzania. Structured 
questionnaires for survey were administered and sufficient data was obtained for 
analysis. A quantitative descriptive design was adopted by the current study.Due to 
inability to determine sampling frame for this sample population, a non- probabilistic 
(purposive) sampling technique was followed.Descriptive statistics, linear regression 
model, binary logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression models were 
employed for analysis.Study findings revealed that, urban based credit customers can 
beeasily identified, their information gathered and monitored, commercial banks 
preferred dealing with them directly because they involves low credit transaction 
costs. On top of that, current study revealed four different credit governance 
structures that may be used by commercial banks to penetrate rural based credit 
market without fear of high transaction costs. These modes of CGSs might be used to 
absorb transaction costs, allow commercial banks credit operations scale up to rural 
areas and easy accessibility of credit facility to majority of Tanzanians. Further the 
study revealed credit monitoring and enforcement costs to be the highest category of 
TCs under commercial banks credit operations in Tanzania. Time costs, transport 
costs, local authority fees, meeting facilitation costs,lawyer fee, business viability 
measuring, food and refreshments costs, contract breaching costs, case filing costs, 
third party hiring costs, tips and other charges were revealed as specific elements of 
transaction costs used as determinants of choice of an efficient credit governance 
structure of commercial banks in Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background Information 
Transaction cost is an important determinant of choice of the best credit governance 
structure of commercial banks in Tanzania. As suggested by Williamson (2010), in 
his analysis of  transaction cost economics theory, where transaction costs is too 
high, beyond acceptable levels, there may not be transaction at all. Such behavior is 
portrayed by commercial banks in Tanzania, where most of them provide credit 
services to urban based customers and ignored rural based customers since 
transaction costs are very high in rural areas.  
 
According to Finscope survey (2013), only 6.8% of Tanzanians who live in rural 
areas have access to financial services from banking sector. Information gap between 
commercial banks and rural based borrowers was a major setback on commercial 
banks behavior of dealing directly with individual borrowers, resulting in high 
transaction costs. High transaction costs influence commercial banks decision not to 
provide credit services at all to rural based borrowers, in turn negatively affecting 
both commercial banks and rural based population, (FSDT, 2013). 
 
Since liberalization of banking industry of Tanzania in 1991, commercial banks 
mostly preferred to directly deal with customers as far as credit provision services is 
concerned. This tendency resulted in limited credit supply from commercial banks to 
most part of the country, especially rural areas due to inability to manage associated 
credit transaction costs as reported by AgFiMS (2011). Major challenges in rural 
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finance in Tanzania relate to information gaps which fall into three categories: (i) 
Knowledge of rural demand and market segmentation by financial institutions; (ii) 
Financial illiteracy of rural borrowers; (iii) Commercial banks knowledge of best 
channels/methods for penetration to rural based market at low transaction costs 
(TCs), FSDT (2013).  
Information is a key input that goes into the credit decision of commercial banks. 
One of the challenges for commercial banks is to acquire information about the 
credit risk of the borrower, as borrowers have more information than the lender about 
the projects (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Transaction cost economic theory argues that 
banks are not interested in offering credit to MSMEs, farmers and poor households 
because information asymmetries resulting to high screening costs, credit contracts 
negotiation costs, monitoring, and enforcement costs. 
Under asymmetric information conditions commercial banks are uncertain about the 
future behavior of the borrower in terms of repayments. High transaction costs 
problems are more likely to occur when commercial banks deal with MSMEs, 
farmers and poor households especially in developing countries rural areas due to 
higher opacity (Berger et al.2001; Beck et al.2004; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008; 
Cole 2004). By opaqueness means, it is difficult to ascertain if borrowers have the 
capacity to pay (have viable project) and/or willingness to pay (due to moral hazard) 
(Beck, 2010). Information asymmetry between borrowers and the commercial banks 
is reflected in inability of the majority of rural based borrowers to provide up to date 
reliable financial information and realistic business plans, which increases credit 
transaction costs. Consequently limits the ability of banks to assess the credit-
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worthiness of the individual borrowers. And therefore commercial banks believed to 
be better-off with some few known credit worth urban based customers, Kessy and 
Temu (2010). 
The argument of information asymmetry is supported by Olomi (2009) and Kibassa 
(2012) who emphasized that poorly compiled records and financial accounts coupled 
with inability of rural based borrowers to properly express their knowledge about 
business opportunities aggregates the lack of adequate information by commercial 
banks. Therefore increases credit transactions costs, when dealing with rural based 
borrowers in Tanzania.  Satta (2003; 2006) amplify this argument by pointing out 
lack of adequate and reliable collateral, lack of appropriate instrument to manage 
risk, not being familiar with complicated information about rural based borrowers 
and perceived risks make Commercial banks in Tanzania become unwilling to 
provide the much-needed finance particularly to rural based borrowers. 
Therefore due to issues described above, Commercial banks opt not to provide 
credits at all or to ration and tighten requirements in order to protect themselves from 
likely opportunistic behavior of borrowers. With an appropriate choice of a credit 
governance structure (CGS) as determined by transaction costs, commercial banks 
will be able to penetrate the rural based market, small and emerging commercial 
banks will enter into credit supply business. Hence increases competition, credit 
accessibility and in turn lower borrowing interest rates, (Mkenda and Campenhout, 
2011), Unfortunately the environment for commercial bank’s credit operation is not 
conducive due to inadequate infrastructure/facilities for smooth banking operations, 
difficulties in identification/accessibility of information for potential 
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customers/borrowers and nature of customers (who wants many but small sized 
credits/loans. Bureaucratic procedures and red tapism by village and district councils, 
lack of collateral or collateral of low market values. These are some of the barriers 
that make banking operations in URT to be very costly and inefficient, especially for 
small private commercial banks, (BOT, 2011). 
The liberalization of banking industry in 1991 aimed at allowing many private 
commercial banks to enter the industry thus increasing competition in provision of 
banking services, i.e. credit service, increases accessibility of banking services by 
many, lowering banks credit interest rates and ultimately eliminating monopoly of 
three banks CRDB, NBC and NMB within the industry. Currently still the 
environment is not conducive to allow efficient operations for most private 
commercial banks to provide credit services especially in rural areas due to above 
problems that lead to high transaction costs as suggested in Tanzania banking sector 
performance report of 2010, (BOT, 2010).  
Few large commercial banks that were previously supported by GOT, i,e CRDB, 
NBC and NMB were able to absorb high transaction costs of providing credits in 
most part of the country, even in rural areas and yet attain super profits at expense of 
the borrowers. Since they shift such high costs as an interest element to borrowers. 
These few big banks to some extent are monopoly in nature when it comes to 
provision of credit facility in URT.  Hence the environment for credit provision and 
governance structure/channels for credit supply need to be properly assessed, 
analyzed and designed. This will allow many commercial banks to provide credits in 
both rural and urban markets, increases competition, lowering transaction costs and 
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borrowing interest. Ultimately minimizes transaction costs of offering credits by 
commercial banks in Tanzania and maximizes profitability. 
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
Despite their ability to incur high transaction costs, only a few commercial banks in 
Tanzania enjoy high profit levels at the expense of borrowers by shifting the burden 
of high transaction costs to borrowing interest rates. Such banks could be considered 
efficient in some ways in terms of observed non-transaction cost attributes like 
volumes of credits given out, profitability, and repayments. Williamson (2000, 2001) 
suggested that when the cost of carrying out a transaction is too high, there won’t be 
transaction at all hence where the banks are not operating they are by implication, 
considered inefficient in transaction cost terms. Coarse (1984, 1992) argued that, 
firms with ability to absorb high transaction costs, enjoy high profit volumes. In 
Tanzania few big commercial banks have to some extent, monopolized the market 
for credit supply due to their ability to absorb transaction costs. 
Recent studies in Tanzania on efficiency of commercial banks focused on 
conventional approaches of measuring efficiency and performance through analyzing 
banks profitability, repayment rates, accessibility to services, geographical coverage, 
transformational/operational costs, interest rates, number of borrowers, productivity 
and portfolio quality, (Wangwe, 2004; Aikaeli, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2010; 
Serengeti, 2012). This study focused on transaction cost as determinants of efficient 
CGSs of commercial banks in Tanzania, for credit operations scale-up purpose.Other 
scholars have done researches on application of transaction costs on Credit 
Governance structures (CGS). Their focus was mainly on demand for credits and not 
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supply side. Ngaruko(2008) focused on how economic reforms of Tanzania 
influenced diversity characteristics of farmers, their farm investment and ultimately 
their demand on agro-credits. He made his analysis through application of 
transaction costs theory. Mkenda and Campenhout(2011) conducted a research on 
estimation of transaction costs in Tanzania supply chain. They focused their analysis 
on commodity exchange of agricultural products. Current study focus on how 
transactions cost determine the best CGS of commercial banks in Tanzania. 
Current study recognizes the need to assess structures that govern credit supply by 
commercial banks. Thus to identify and advice on the most suitable CGS given 
transaction costs. Since the amount of transaction costs incurred by banks in 
supplying credits influences choice of a CGS. With cost efficient CGS, small 
commercial banks will enter into credit supply business. Hence increases 
competition, credit accessibility and in turn lower borrowing interest rates.    
1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 General Objective 
The general objective of this research is to assess transaction cost determinants of 
credit governance structures (CGSs) of commercial banks in Tanzania. 
 
1.3.2     Specific Objectives 
 (a) To describe commercial banks credit governance structures and transaction costs 
categories in credit administration.   
 (b)To identify significant transaction costs determinants associated with credit 
governance structures of commercial banks to current and potential customers. 
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 (c) To analyze effects of transaction costs on choice of credit governance structures 
by commercial banks  
 
1.4 Research Hypothesis 
(a)  There is no relationship between total costs for supplying credits directly to 
borrowers and credit supply through profit intermediary banks. 
(b)  There is no relationship between time variable and total transaction costs. 
(c)  There is relationship between transaction costs and credit governance structures 
(d)   There is relationship between transaction costs and choice of urban based 
customers 
 
1.5 Research Significance 
(a)  It will improve understanding on the economics theory of transaction cost and 
its relevance on formal financial institutions operations (i.e. commercial banks) 
in Tanzania. 
(b)  It will assist experts and the government of URT in Financial policy 
modification, formulation of rules and regulations that govern financial 
institutions operations as well as creation of conducive environment for 
availability of credit facilities and other financial services to majority of 
Tanzanian. 
(c)  It will serve as a reference for anyone who will be interested to carry out a 
research on credit supply governance structures and their associated transaction 
costs for commercial banks in Tanzania. 
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1.6  Organization of the Thesis Report 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the study by 
presenting relevant background information, problem statement, study objectives, 
research hypotheses, and study significance. Chapter two presents a detailed review 
of the literature related to status of banking industry and credit services, transaction 
cost economics and governance structures. The chapter further present’s theories 
related to credit supply. Study conceptual framework which forms a basis of analysis 
of issues related to transaction costs as determining factor of an efficient choice of 
credit governance structure for commercial banks credit supply in Tanzania, was 
presented in this chapter. Chapter three presents a description of the methodology of 
the study. It includes the research philosophy,study area, sampling techniques, 
methods for data collection and analysis. Chapter four presents the findings and 
discussions of the study. The chapter specifically presents alternative modes of CGSs 
and their comparisons in terms of preferences, costs and customer categories. A 
detailed analysis of transaction cost categories has been done. Chapter five critically 
analysed causality effects of transaction costs categories and specific elements of 
TCs on TTC. Effects of TCs on choice of an efficient CGS and on choice of urban 
vs. rural based credit customers have been analysed. Final chapter six presents 
discussion of key study findings, conclusion and recommendations in terms of policy 
and areas for further studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Definition of Key Terms and Concepts 
2.1.1  Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs have been broadly defined by  Cheung (1989) as any costs that are 
not conceivable in a "Robinson Crusoe economy". In other words, any costs that 
arise due to the existence of institutions. For the purpose of this study, the cost of 
using price mechanisms, which means the cost of carrying out transactions by way of 
exchange in an open market system is referred to transaction cost. This definition 
was given out by Coarse (1937, 1960, 1984, and 1992). 
 
2.1.2  Governance Structure  
Is the arrangement made between contracting parties with an intention to protect 
their relationship-specific investments at the possible least cost, as suggested by 
(Klein, 1999).A set of rules for regulating and governing contracts (rules and 
regulations that allow contracts to be enforced in case of default) and complete them, 
as defined by Williamson (1995, 2000). Thus a set of rules and regulations, 
procedures and policies (designed structure) for governing credit contracts due to 
their incompleteness, in this study is referred to governance structure. 
 
2.1.3  Credit 
Yunus (1998) defined credit as resources to another party where that second party 
does not reimburse the first party immediately (thereby generating a debt), but 
instead arranges either to repay or return those resources (or other materials of equal 
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value) at a later date. The resources provided may be financial (e.g. granting a loan), 
or they may consist of goods or services (e.g. consumer credit). For the purpose of 
this study such resources are financial. Credit encompasses any form of deferred 
payment.  Credit is extended by a creditor, also known as a lender, to a debtor, also 
known as a borrower. This definition is adopted for this study 
 
2.1.4 Governance Structure Efficiency 
Commons (1932) argues that, beyond simple market exchange, the continuity of an 
exchange relationship was often important and therefore governance structure is 
chosen in cost effective degree to infuse order and thereby to mitigate conflicts and 
realize mutual gains. According to Williamson (1971), in transaction costs 
economics, there are numerous number of governance modes due to incompleteness 
of contractual relations and investment to specific assets for long term contracts. 
Governance structure efficiency is achieved whenever the choice among alternative 
modes of governance is made mainly for the purpose of economizing on transaction 
costs.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
2.2.1  The Credit Theory  
Credit theories of money (also called debt theories of money) are concerned with the 
relationship between credit and money. Proponents of these theories, such as Innes, 
(1914) emphasized that credit and debt are the same thing, seen from different points 
of view. Proponents assert that the essential nature of money is credit (debt), at least 
in eras where money was not backed by a commodity such as gold. Two common 
strands of thought within these theories are the idea that money originated as a unit 
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of account for debt, and the position that money creation involves the simultaneous 
creation of money and debt. Some proponents of credit theories of money argue that 
money is best understood as debt even in systems often understood as using 
commodity money. 
 
The Credit Theory generally states that: A sale and Purchase is the exchange of a 
commodity for credit. From this main theory springs the sub-theory that the value of 
credit or money does not depend on the value of any metal or metals, but on the right 
which the creditor acquires to "payment," that is to say, to satisfaction for the credit, 
and on the obligation of the debtor to "pay" his debt and conversely on the right of 
the debtor to release himself from his debt by the tender of an equivalent debt owed 
by the creditor, and the obligation of the creditor to accept this tender in satisfaction 
of his credit. Implication of this theory is, creation of more credits means creation of 
more money and attainment of super profits for credits creators (Commercial banks). 
Thus commercial banks are expected to invest more in credit businesses. Despite that 
fact, commercial banks in Tanzania are behaving differently; they are not investing 
in credit business, especially in rural areas. This theory does not give reasons for 
such behavior. 
 
2.2.2   Micro-Financing Theories 
Theories on microfinance suggest that, microfinance aims at provision of financial 
services to low income households, farmers, micro and small enterprises. Yunus 
(1998) argues that, microfinance allow provision of microcredit to individuals that 
lack collateral, steady employment, verifiable credit history and therefore cannot 
meet even minimum qualification to gain access to traditional credit. Currently in 
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Tanzania almost every commercial bank has a micro financing window for its 
customers. 
 
The main purpose is to create a banking system based on mutual trust, 
accountability, participation and creativity. Thus micro financing window provides 
credits to poor households, micro and small businesses and farmers situated in most 
parts of rural areas without a need of collateral. With this ideology, commercial 
banks were expected to invest more in credit business and lead to expansion of credit 
facilities throughout the country. Despite that, it has never been the case. Most 
commercial banks are not investing in credit business and those which are already in 
exit from credit business. Microfinance theories dot not explain reasons for above 
facts. 
 
2.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction Cost Economics focuses on the organization of transactions that occur 
whenever a good or service is transferred from a provider to a user across a 
technologically separable interface. When transactions occur within an organization, 
the transaction costs can include managing and monitoring personnel and procuring 
inputs and capital equipment. The transaction costs of buying the same good or 
service from an external provider can include the costs of source selection, contract 
management, performance measurement, and dispute resolution. Thus, the 
organization of transactions, or “governance structure,” affects transaction costs as 
pointed out by Williamson (1989).TCE represents another approach to studying 
institutional arrangements.  
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It holds that all but the simplest transactions require some kind of mechanism to 
protect the transacting parties from various hazards associated with exchange. This 
mechanism is what Williamson (1995, 2000) refers to as the governance structure. 
The appropriate governance structure depends on the characteristics of the 
transaction, thus TCE implies an applied research programme of comparative 
contractual analysis i.e. how different forms of governance work in various 
circumstance. For this reason, TCE (associated with Williamson) is sometimes 
described as the “governance” branch of the NIE, as opposed to the “measurement” 
branch (associated with Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). TCE is the most widely used 
approach in NIE (New institutional economics) related researches and in fact, as also 
pointed out  by Hubbard (1997), TCE stands at the heart of NIE. 
 
2.2.3.1 The Economics of Organization: Transaction Costs Approach 
The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the 
transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that understanding of transaction 
costs economizing is central to the study of organization. Application of this 
approach require that, transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative 
governance structures be described. Economizing is accomplished by assigning 
transactions to governance structure in a discriminating way. The approach applies 
both to the determination of efficient boundaries, as between firms and markets, and 
to the organizational of internal transactions, Williamson, (1981).Williamson (2000), 
pointed out that, the proposition that the firm is a production function to which a 
profit maximization objective has been assigned has been less illuminating for 
organization theory purposes than for economics. Even within economics, however, 
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there is a growing realization that, the neo-classical theory of the firm is self-
limiting. A variety of economic approaches to the study of organization have 
recently been proposed in which the importance of internal organizations is 
acknowledged. The one described here emphasizes on transaction costs and efforts to 
economize there on.  
 
Economic approaches to the study of organizations, transaction costs analysis 
included, generally focus on efficiency. To be sure not every interesting 
organizational issue can be usefully addressed, except perhaps in a minor way, in 
efficiency terms. A surprisingly large number can, however, especially if transaction 
costs aspect are emphasized. This is accomplished by making the transaction rather 
than the commodities the basic unit of analysis and by assessing governance 
structures of which firms and markets are the leading alternatives in terms of their 
capacity to economize on of transaction costs, Williamson (2010). 
 
Efficient Boundaries decided what transactions are to be included in the organization 
and effectively defines the organizational boundary. If assets are nonspecific, 
markets enjoy advantages in both production cost and governance cost respects; 
static scale economies can be more fully exhausted by buying instead of making; 
markets can also aggregate uncorrelated demands, thereby realizing risk-pooling 
benefits; and external procurement avoids many of the hazards to which internal 
procurement is subject. Some advantages of firms over markets include internal 
organizations are able to invoke fiat to resolve differences and better access to 
information. Incentive to shift transactions inside the firm increases with 
uncertainty.Williamson argues in The Mechanisms of Governance (1996) that 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) differs from neoclassical microeconomics in the 
following aspects: Behavioral assumptions, whereas neoclassical theory assumes 
rationality and ignores most of the hazards related to opportunism, TCE assumes 
bounded rationality. Unit of analysis, whereas neoclassical theory is concerned with 
composite goods and services, TCE analyzes the transaction itself.  
 
Governance structure, whereas neoclassical theory describes the firm as a production 
function (a technological construction), TCE describes it as a governance structure 
(an organizational construction). Problematic property rights and contracts, whereas 
neoclassical theory often assumes that property rights are clearly defined and the cost 
of enforcing those rights by the mean of courts is negligible, TCE treats property 
rights and contracts as problematic. Discrete structural analysis, whereas 
neoclassical theory uses continuous marginal modes of analysis in order to achieve 
second-order economizing (adjusting margins), TCE analyzes the basic structures of 
the firm and its governance in order to achieve first-order economizing (improving 
the basic governance structure).Remediable, whereas neoclassical theory recognizes 
profit maximization or cost minimization as criteria of efficiency, TCE insists that 
there is no optimal solution and that all alternatives are flawed, thus bounding 
"optimal" efficiency to the solution with no superior alternative and whose 
implementation produces net gains. 
 
2.2.3.2 Asset Specificity and Transaction Cost 
Some goods and services can be produced more efficiently if one of the parties 
invests in “transaction-specific” assets that cannot easily be put to other uses if the 
buyer/seller relationship breaks down. Asset specificity can take a variety of forms as 
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suggested by Williamson (1991), including site or location specificity—a buyer or 
seller locates its facilities next to the other to economize on inventories or 
transportation costs. Physical asset specificity—investments are made in specialized 
equipment or tooling designed for a particular customer. Human capital specificity—
one or both of the parties develop skills or knowledge specific to the buyer-seller 
relationship. Dedicated capacity—capacity is created to serve a customer who is 
large relative to market size, so that it would be difficult to find alternative customers 
and brand name capital—the parties must maintain the reputation of a shared brand 
name; for example, in franchise relationships the reputation of the franchise depends 
on the behavior of the individual franchisees. 
 
According to Williamson (1991), since the value of the transaction-specific assets 
depends on the continued existence of the buyer/seller relationship, the party that has 
not invested may expropriate some of the value of the investment by threatening to 
walk away from the relationship. If the investor cannot be assured of realizing the 
full value of the transaction-specific investment, efficient investments that reduce the 
cost of production may not be made, resulting in higher costs to both parties. 
 
Bounded rationality may also interfere with the efficient operation of transactions. 
Because of limited managerial time and span of control, organizations cannot 
effectively manage an unlimited number of transactions internally. In addition, 
bounded rationality limits the capability of markets and simple contracts to handle 
asset specificity, because the parties cannot foresee and contract for all possible 
contingencies, as argued by Williamson (1995, 2000). 
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2.2.3.3 Governance Structures, Strengths and Weaknesses 
For many types of transactions, markets are the preferred governance structure 
because they provide “high-powered incentives.” That is, the supplier reaps the full 
benefits or bears the full costs of its own activities, and has a strong incentive to 
maximize value net of production costs, and to respond quickly to changes in the 
market prices of inputs or outputs. However, Transaction Cost Economics argues 
that markets have difficulty dealing with some transactions because of asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, and opportunistic behavior by the parties to the 
transaction. Since buyers and sellers can easily walk away from pure, spot-market 
transactions, they offer no protection against opportunism when transaction-specific 
assets are involved, as pointed out by Williamson (1991). 
Williamson (2010) argues that, contracts offer some protection for transaction-
specific assets by tying the buyer and seller together for a specified period. However, 
bounded rationality precludes comprehensive ex ante contracting that specifies how 
the parties will behave in all possible circumstances. If contracts are inherently 
incomplete, parties may perceive potential gains from opportunistic behavior. As a 
result, attention must be focused on more complex (or internalized) governance 
mechanisms to fill gaps in the contract, settle disputes, and adapt to new conditions. 
Contracting parties may also make ex ante efforts to screen counterparties in terms of 
reliability or reputation, and/or design ex post safeguards to protect transaction-
specific investments. 
When asset specificity, bounded rationality, and opportunism make contracting 
problems severe, vertical integration may be needed to ensure that the value of 
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transaction-specific assets is internalized. It can also allow for flexible redeployment 
of assets and personnel when the conditions surrounding the transaction change. 
However, bounded rationality limits the span of effective managerial control. Lower-
level managers and employees may engage in sub optimizing behavior, or they may 
have insufficient incentives to minimize production costs. Mohrman (1996) 
recommended that, if it is feasible to have more than one source of supply, 
organizations can mitigate some of the negative effects of markets and vertical 
integration by maintaining both internal and external providers. 
Williamson (2010) recommended that, outsourcing part of the workload to an 
external provider or allowing internal customers the option to buy externally can 
create incentives for the internal provider to control costs and improve performance 
by exposing it to market pressures. Conversely, retaining some capability to produce 
in-house can allow organizations to maintain management competencies needed to 
make more effective sourcing decisions; retain some leverage over the external 
provider, particularly when there are only a few potential suppliers; and maintain 
surge capacity. 
2.2.3.4Efficient Governance Structure and Transaction Characteristics 
Tadelis (2002) suggested that, efficient governance structure depends on 
characteristics of transaction costs. Markets provide stronger incentives to maximize 
value net of production costs. Vertical integration may be a more cost-effective 
governance structure for transactions involving asset specificity. The central 
recommendation of TCE is that the governance structure for a particular transaction 
should be chosen to maximize value net of both production and governance costs. 
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Thus in making outsourcing decisions, it is important to consider not only the 
internal and external costs of providing the good or service, but also the cost of 
managing the transaction internally and externally. 
Williamson (1995) also added that, market governance of transactions may impede 
efficient investment in transaction-specific assets because of the potential for 
opportunistic behavior. Contracts can protect transaction-specific investments to 
some extent, but bounded rationality prevents contracts from specifying all possible 
contingencies. As contracts become more flexible, they allow more potential for 
opportunism. Thus when asset specificity, combined with the potential for 
opportunism and bounded rationality, organizations should not settle for spot 
markets, simple short term contracts and long term contracts only but also consider 
use of relational contracts and vertical integration.  However, bounded rationality 
also places a limit on the number of activities that can be controlled within a single 
organization, so firms should only internalize transactions that they can govern more 
effectively than through markets or contracts. 
2.2.4 Determinants of Bank’s Credit Supply 
In a recent study Guo and Stepanyan (2011) indicated that domestic and foreign 
funding are positively associated with the credit growth. The stronger economic 
growth leads to higher credit growth, whereas higher inflation lessens the real credit 
growth in the economy. Monetary policy has also a significant impact on credit 
growth, the soft monetary conditions of the country as well as global, lead to more 
credit, and finally the strong banking sector positively influence credit growth. 
Chernykh and Theodossiou (2011), by using a sample of Russian banks, found that 
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the median banks assign only 0.5 percent of its total assets in terms of long-term 
loans to business and there is large cross-sectional disparity in this ratio among 
banks.They argued that the bank’s capacity to expand long-term business loans 
depends on various factors including its capitalization, size and the availability of 
long-term liabilities, however, the ownership of banks did not matter. They also 
concluded that the banks hesitated to issue business loans with more than three years 
maturity.  
 
Chernykh and Theodossiou (2011), their results exhibit that the banks with lower 
level of capital, the banks having lower funding for long term loans and banks in 
most competitive areas are reluctant to supply long term loans. They considered 
weak creditor rights protection, enforcement and the low creditworthiness of risky 
borrowers as other hurdles in providing long-term loans to firms. According to Aisen 
and Franken (2010) prior to financial crisis the bank credit growth was larger as 
compared to post crisis period. Using a sample over eighty countries they also 
concluded that the countercyclical monetary policy and liquidity position of the 
banks played a crucial role and lessened the bank credit reduction in the post crisis 
era.  
 
These findings advocate that the countries should follow the appropriate institutional 
and macroeconomic structure favorable to countercyclical monetary policies. They 
also found that the countries responding differently in various regions of the world, 
due to diversity in countries’ structural characteristics e.g. financial depth and 
integration. 
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Takats (2010) studied the bank lending behavior and empirically found that during 
the financial crisis the cross-border bank lending declined sharply. Using the data of 
twenty-one emerging markets, he concluded that during the financial crises the 
demand and supply factors contributed to the fall in bank lending, but the impact of 
supply factors were dominant.  
However, both the factors appear to have more balanced effects in pre-crisis period. 
Furthermore, supply shock was the key determinant of slowdown in cross border 
lending to emerging economies. The credit growth before the crisis was vastly 
different across countries and regions. During the post crisis period the emerging 
markets experienced a considerable slowdown in credit growth (Guo and Stepanyan 
2011) compared to pre-crisis period. Most developing economies also face 
slowdown in post crises period. 
2.3 Empirical Literature of Banking Industry 
Financial sectors are generally underdeveloped in Sub-Saharan Africa, with banking 
systems accounting for the majority of financial sector assets and activities. 
Kasekende (2010) suggested that, as a result of reforms, the depth and coverage of 
financial systems–as measured by the ratios of broad money and private sector credit 
to GDP–has been gradually increasing over the past decade. But the scale of 
financial intermediation in the region remains significantly lower than in other 
developing regions of the world, while access to financial services is also relatively 
low, reflecting a combination of low income levels, small absolute size, and 
infrastructure weaknesses. Confirming these observations, a recent World Bank 
study notes that SSA typically scores lowest among the world’s developing sub-
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regions on various dimensions of financial development, such as depth and 
efficiency of financial institutions (Čihák, 2012). 
Most banking systems in sub-Saharan Africa are small in absolute and relative size. 
They are characterized by low loan-deposit ratios and, as a corollary, large shares of 
assets held in the form of government securities and liquid assets. Lending is mainly 
short-term in nature, with about 60 percent of loans having a maturity of less than 
one year.SSA banks are typically high-cost operations notwithstanding the 
concentration of branches in a small number of urban centers.  
As a corollary, interest rate spreads and service fee levels are comparatively high. 
Foreign banks play a key role in SSA banking systems, having recovered market 
share as banking systems were restructured and state banks privatized under reform 
programs in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, banking systems are characterized by 
modest reach in terms of providing financial services to the population; the share of 
the population that is unbanked is very large, with SMEs typically tightly constrained 
in their access to any form of credit, (Čihák, 2012). 
The stylized features of SSA banking systems reflect a combination of factors, 
including the small absolute size of banks and banking systems; low income levels, 
large informal sectors, and low levels of financial literacy; weak contractual 
frameworks for banking activities, including weak creditor rights and judicial 
enforcement mechanisms; and political risk (McDonald and Schumacher, 2007; 
Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009; Beck and others, 2011).  In many countries, banking 
systems are characterized by significant excess liquidity, reflecting the scarcity of 
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what banks deem to be credit-worthy borrowers. In such circumstances, monetary 
policy is relatively ineffective as a tool for influencing lending conditions and the 
broader monetary aggregates (and, by extension, economic activity and inflation). 
Following reform programs introduced in the 1980s and 1990s, banks have moved to 
strength their capital bases and improve risk management (Mlambo, Kasekende, and 
Murinde, 2012). In addition, the reduced role of state-owned banks or, in some cases, 
their reorientation towards operating on commercial lines has contributed to the 
strengthening of banking systems’ financial health. As a result, the incidence of 
systemic banking crises –a relatively common event in SSA in the 1980s and early 
1990s –has declined markedly, with only one major crisis recorded since 1995 
African banking systems rely on the domestic economy for their funding base, with 
funding from non-residents a very minor source of funds in almost all cases.This is 
in many ways a demand-side phenomenon, the limited supply of what banks deem to 
be credit-worthy borrowers is a binding constraint on the growth of lending activity 
in most countries. 
The banking sectors in East African Community countries dominate their financial 
sectors. However, the development and sophistication level of the banking sectors 
varies significantly across the region, with Kenya having one of the most dynamic 
and largest banking sectors in sub-Saharan Africa, and a significant presence in the 
other EAC countries.  
The banking sectors of the other four countries are concentrated on their local 
markets. The sophistication of capital markets in EAC differs across the region, but 
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in general, they remain underdeveloped. There are important cross-country 
differences, with some markets at an early stage of development, while Kenya’s 
market is reasonably well-developed in sub-Saharan African context, (Mlambo, 
Kasekende, and Murinde, 2012).The less developed domestic debt markets are 
shallow and narrow as pointed out by Kasekende (2012). They are characterized by 
short-term maturities, limited investor base, and illiquid secondary markets, among 
others, and are dominated by government securities. Stock markets also remain 
underdeveloped, with secondary markets either illiquid or non-existent. In general, 
EAC capital markets have not played a major role in resource mobilization and long-
term financing of their economies. They are yet to be developed to a level that could 
make them a significant complement and/or an important alternative to banking 
intermediation.   
Similarly, insurance companies and pension funds in the EAC region remain 
underdeveloped and offer only a limited array of financial instruments to a limited 
set of clients. Thus, there is potential for these business lines to be developed further 
to better serve the needs of the individuals/enterprises and their economies in 
general. In addition, as they grow and become more and more interlinked with banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds are increasingly contributing to the potential 
risks to the stability of the financial systems, (Kasekende,2010). 
The banking sectors in EAC consist mainly of commercial banks, while Rwanda and 
Burundi also have a development bank. In addition, the EAC members also share a 
common development bank, the East African Development Bank (EADB). 
Furthermore, all five countries have brought some microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
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under the regulation of their central banks, which have become a part of the banking 
system. These institutions may either be microfinance banks, deposit or non-deposit 
taking MFIs, (Sanya and Gaertner, 2012).EAC banking sectors are rather 
concentrated and empirical evidence suggests that the banking sectors are most 
accurately characterized as monopolistic competition (Sanya and Gaertner, 2012). 
While there are no regulatory barriers to competition per se, in most countries across 
the region former state-owned/legacy banks retain a very large market share despite 
steps to reduce regulatory barriers to entry and exit and to attract increased 
participation from foreign banks. The latter indeed have a very significant market 
share in the region, which makes it difficult for (non-dominant) local banks to 
compete as they typically have access to lower cost of financing and superior 
technology from parent banks.  
In this context, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence shows that foreign 
banks have not increased competition in the region (Sanya and Gaertner, 2012). In 
order to improve competition and access to finance, empirical evidence further 
suggests that the region will have to tackle obstacles such as legal infrastructure 
(collateral, foreclosure, bankruptcy), financial infrastructure (credit bureaus, payment 
systems), and market segmentation due to a large legacy and foreign-bank presence. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that interest-rate spreads and the cost of 
finance remain high. 
Tanzania banking sector experienced fundamental changes over the last decade 
during banks and other financial institutions reforms starting early 1990s. Despite 
that, what is still hidden is the extent to which banks are efficient in Tanzania. 
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Banking industry in Tanzania is open to entry and therefore it is highly contestable. 
Commercial banks in the country can be subdivided into three major categories: 
large domestic banks; subsidiaries of the major international banks; and small banks. 
About 50 percent of the total banks’ assets are held in the large domestic banks while 
subsidiaries of the major international banks account for 40 percent and the small 
banks hold the remaining 10 percent, (BOT, 2010). 
 
Commercial banks hold a unique position in most economies as creator of money, 
the principal depositories of the public financial savings, the primary allocator of 
credit and manager of country’s payment systems. They therefore perform an 
intermediate function as gatherers of deposits and allocator of credits.  It is through 
this function banks contribute in the financial growth of the country as reported by 
Kim (1987). The banking system in Tanzania has a long history from the colonial era 
to the times of socialism regime and now to the market oriented economy. There 
have been changes in the sector after the era enactment of the banking and financial 
Institutions Act 1991.  
 
The state owned banks have been restructured and the private banks licensed to carry 
out the banking business. In 1967 all private banks were nationalized by the 
government, under the NBC Act 1967, all commercial banks were merged into one 
bank “The National Bank of Commerce”. It was hoped that a nationalized banking 
system, would transcend the limitation of the foreign banks and attain; Rapid 
extension of banking facilities throughout the country, accelerated rate of savings 
mobilization, efficient distribution of credits through the banking system according  
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to nation  priorities and modest profit for the government. The banking sector 
eventually became a monopoly one, (Wangwe, 2004).  
 
Unexpectedly the banking sector performed poorly partly because of undue 
government interferences and partly due to the in effective banking legislation that 
was in operation at that time. In 1991 an Act was enacted to consolidate the law 
relating to banking and harmonize the operations of all the financial institutions in 
Tanzania. It was and still is expected that, the Act will foster sound banking activities 
and regulate credit operations. Wangwe (2004) found that up to 1993 the banking 
system consisted entirely of in solvent and in efficient government owned banks. The 
largest being the National Bank of Commerce which for stance accounted for 90 
percent of Commercial Bank deposits. The Cooperative and Rural Development 
Bank which accounted for five percent of the sector. 
 
For most of the period since the late 1960s and 1970s the Tanzanian financial sector 
was mainly government-owned with pervasive government interference in the 
financial system. Credit was directed on the basis of government priorities with little 
regard to credit-worthiness, and banks were convenient agents of fiscal policy. Two 
institutions, the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) and the Cooperative and Rural 
Development Bank (CRDB) were dominant in providing financial services. NBC 
provided working capital and other short term finance to agriculture and other rural 
activities. CRDB provided development finance to rural development activities. 
These two institutions had virtual monopoly in their functional areas. Each institution 
was governed by its own stature and the Bank of Tanzania’s (BOT) supervisory role 
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had been limited. Finally, the environment in which the formal financial institutions 
operated was also regulated by the state, (BOT, 2000).  
 
It was further elaborated in the report, BOT (2000) that credit was allocated 
administratively by the BOT which established legal ceiling in bank lending and 
deposits in addition to regulating interest rates. In the prevailing environment, the 
financial sector’s performance was very poor and savings mobilization was 
neglected, credits to cooperatives increased, and no pressure was applied on 
borrowers to repay. The Government of Tanzania’s (GOT) policies resulted in over-
staffed and inefficient banks. These credits policies led in 1988 to 70% of NBC’s 
loan/credits portfolio to be in arrears and 95% of this was accounted for by 
parastatals and a substantial share by cooperatives.  
The Cooperative Rural Development Bank’s (CRDB) rural sector credit portfolio 
was no better, with 66% of its credit portfolio in arrears as of end 1988.With a non-
performing loan/credit portfolio and unable to attract deposits. The formal financial 
sector was bankrupt, and dependent on financing from the GOT. In response to the 
difficult financial position, in 1991, GOT enacted the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act which liberalized the banking industry of Tanzania. Private banks 
were licensed and allowed to carry on banking business throughout the country, as 
indicated in the report of BOT (1996). 
2.4 Summary of Concepts, Theories and Empirical Literature 
Several terms and concepts were used in the current study, including transaction 
costs, governance structure, credit and governance structure efficiency. Transaction 
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costs as used in the current study means the cost of using price mechanisms, or the 
cost of carrying out transactions by way of exchange in an open market system. This 
definition was given out by Coarse (1937, 1960, 1984, and 1992).Williamson (1995, 
2000), defined governance structure as a set of rules and regulations, procedures and 
policies (designed structure) for governing credit contracts due to their 
incompleteness, this definition was adopted in this study.  
 
The accepted definition of credit in current study was given by Yunus (1998) as 
resources to another party where that second party does not reimburse the first party 
immediately (thereby generating a debt), but instead arranges either to repay or 
return those resources (or other materials of equal value) at a later date. For purpose 
of current study, as suggested by Williamson (1971), there said to be governance 
structure efficiency whenever the choice among alternative modes of governance is 
made mainly for the purpose of economizing on transaction costs. 
 
Several theories were studied before transaction cost economics theory was selected 
as the guiding theory for current study. The credit theory by Innes (1914), 
emphasized that, money and credit were one and the same. Implication of this theory 
was, creation of more credits means creation of more money and attainment of super 
profits for credits creators (Commercial banks). Thus commercial banks were 
expected to invest more in credit businesses. Despite that fact, commercial banks in 
Tanzania are behaving differently; they are not investing in credit business, 
especially in rural areas. This theory does not give reasons for such behavior. 
Transaction cost economics theory does. 
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Microfinance theories as pioneered by Yunus (1998) aimed at providing credits to 
poor households, micro and small businesses and farmers situated in most parts of 
rural areas without a need of collateral, steady employment or verifiable credit 
history and therefore cannot meet even minimum qualification to gain access to 
traditional credit. With this ideology, commercial banks in Tanzania were expected 
to invest more in credit business and lead to expansion of credit facilities throughout 
the country. Despite that, it has never been the case. Most commercial banks despite 
of having a micro financing window, were not investing in credit business and some 
of those which were already in, exit from credit business. Microfinance theories do 
not explain reasons for above facts. Transaction cost economics theory does. 
 
Transaction cost economics theory, this was the main and guiding theory for the 
current study. It was pioneered by Coarse (1937) and Williamson (1971). Though it 
is a new theory since it is currently being tested in a number of sectors, it gave 
answers to most unanswered questions from the credit theory and Microfinance 
theory. According to this theory, when transaction costs is too high, there may not be 
transaction at all, due to in ability of transacting parties to absorb such high costs, 
this behavior is observed in commercial banks credits operations in Tanzania, 
particularly in rural areas.  
 
This theory provides solution by further suggesting that, if transacting parties will 
develop contractual arrangements/ alternative modes of governance structures to 
protect them against opportunistic behavior and absorb high transaction costs, credit 
transactions will take place at mutual gain despite presence of high transaction 
costs.Since liberalization of banking industry of Tanzania in 1991, a number of 
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private commercial banks were formulated and state owned banks were privatized, 
Wangwe (2004). Currently there are at least 34 registered and licensed commercial 
banks, that operate in Tanzania main land and Zanzibar, BOT (2015).  Tanzania 
credit supply market has been dominated by three large domestic commercial banks, 
namely CRDB, NMB and NBC. These banks supply credits to both urban and rural 
based market yet majority of those in need of credit services, and especially in rural 
areas are not reached.  Illiteracy, poor infrastructure facilities, deep poverty, 
difficulties in identification and accessibility of borrower’s information are some of 
the factors leading to high transaction costs when transacting credits with rural based 
customers. 
 
As a result of high transaction costs associated with commercial banks credit 
operations in rural areas, most commercial banks concentrate only with some few 
urban based customers they consider credit worth. Thus most commercial banks in 
Tanzania are considered inefficient in transaction costs terms due to their in ability to 
scale up their credit operations to rural areas where majority of those in need of 
financial services live. Only banks with ability to absorb high transaction costs, 
i.e.CRDB, NBC and NMB have penetrated rural based market. With reference to 
transaction cost economics theory, when parties to a transaction formulate alternative 
modes of governance structures, with ability to absorb high transaction costs, such 
parties will transact at mutual gain and reap benefits despite high transaction costs 
are considered efficient. 
2.5  Conceptual Framework 
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The framework described in Figure 2.1 indicates significant relationship that exists 
between transaction costs and choice of an efficient CGS. The amount of transaction 
costs, mostly depends on the circumstances under which commercial banks want to 
offer credits (TCDs). Such circumstances include but not limited to borrowers 
distance, borrowers reputation, borrowing frequency, loan amount, repayment rate, 
trust, decision lag, collateral and market value of collateral. In this framework, 
transaction cost is independent variable used to predict choice of an efficient CGS, 
thus CGS is dependent variable predicted by transaction costs.Even though 
transaction costs is a significant independent variable for determining choice of an 
efficient CGS, but also there are other minor predictors for an appropriate choice of 
CGS, such factors includes type of business activity, size and structure of business 
capital, nature of business market and business management style. The focus of this 
study is on how transaction costs influence choice of an efficient CGS of commercial 
banks in Tanzania. 
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Figure 2.1: Relationship of Transaction Costs and CGSs 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
Whereby; 
CGS1 is a direct channel for credit supply to borrowers 
CGS2 is indirect channel for credit supply through profit intermediary banks 
CGS3 is indirect channel for credit supply through profit intermediary microfinance 
institutions 
CGS4 is indirect channel for credit supply through non-profit intermediaries 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Overview 
Thischapter clearly point out and explain the ideology, methods, techniques and 
processes used by the researcher to attain research objectives and testing of 
hypothesis. The researcher adopted positivism philosophy. Quantitative descriptive 
design and a cross-sectional survey were followed. Structured questionnaires were 
pre-tested and used to collect primary data from all registered and licensed 
commercial banks. Non-probabilistic sampling method (purposive sampling) was 
used. Data were analyzed through descriptive statistics methods, correlation analysis, 
linear regression and logistic regression methods. 
3.2  Research Philosophy 
This research to a large extent adopts quantitative paradigm. A paradigm is 
understood as a way of looking at the social reality or the world that is composed of 
certain philosophical assumptions that guide and direct thinking and actions (Mertens 
1998 in Milliken, 2001). According to (Johnston, 2014) the approach chosen for a 
research project is influenced by ontological and epistemological assumptions or 
stances of the researcher. (Morgan and Sklar, 2012) cite that, ontology refers to what 
is reality while epistemology is concerned with how reality can be known. Within 
social sciences there has been a long standing debate about the most appropriate 
philosophical positions between positivism and phenomenology from which research 
methods should be derived, (Milliken, 2001). Positivists who advocate for natural 
science, reject subjectivity in research by assuming that an objective world exists 
 35
independently of the researcher and that one can uncover universal laws of human 
nature and social reality, (Patton and Appelbaum, 2003). On the other hand, a 
phenomenologist’s researcher believes that the world and reality are not objective 
and exterior but that they are socially constructed and given meaning by social 
actors, (Milliken 2001). Current study advocates positivism ideology. The approach 
adopted in this study (positivism) aims at utilizing hypotheses to test existing 
theories for generalization purpose in different settings. 
3.3 Research Design 
Current study used quantitative descriptive design. The study utilized quantitative 
and statistical aspect of data organization, presentation and analysis through figures, 
numbers and tables.It useddeductive reasoning, where the researcher forms an 
hypothesis, collects data in an investigation of the problem, and then used the data 
from the investigation, after analysis is made and conclusions are shared, to prove 
the hypotheses true or false. Also aimed at clearly describing identified variables of 
study and their relationship. A survey strategy was opted for the above design.   
3.4 Area of the Study 
The study was carried out in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. A sample of 204 credit 
officers from all commercial banks that provide credit services to micro, small and 
medium enterprises and farmers with headquarters in Dar es Salaam,were involved 
in the study and one commercial bank (people’s bank of Zanzibar) with headquarters 
in Zanzibar was also included in the study. Current study was not extended to other 
regions since the amount and quality of data captured in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar 
was considered to be satisfactory. 
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3.5 Data Collection Methods 
This study employed different methods of data collection, whereby both primary and 
secondary data were collected. Structured questionnaires for survey were 
administered to commercial banks credit officers to collect primary data. A 
questionnaire is a set of systematically structured questions used by a researcher to 
get needed information from respondents. Questionnaires have been termed 
differently, including surveys, schedules, indexes/indicators, profiles, studies, 
opinionnaires, checklists, scales, inventories, forms, inter alia. They are written 
instruments that present respondents with a series of questions or statements to which 
they are to react either by writing out their answers or selecting from among existing 
answers, (Brown, 2001). 
The questionnaire may be self-administered, posted or presented in an interview 
format. A questionnaire may include check lists, attitude scales, projective 
techniques, rating scales and a variety of other research methods. As an important 
research instrument and a tool for data collection, a questionnaire has its main 
function as measurement, Oppenheim (1992). It is the main data collection method in 
surveys and yield to quantitative data, (Dornyei, 2007). The study also used 
secondary data. The main sources were documentary review of various official 
documents and reports (i.e. BOT reports) relevant to the research problem from 
commercial banks and different libraries. 
3.6 Population and Sampling 
The targeted population was from all commercial banks with headquarters in Dar es 
Salaam and Zanzibar, where the targeted sampling unit was commercial bank’s 
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credit officers.  Due to inability to determine sampling frame since the population 
(all employees from commercial banks with knowledge and experience in 
administration and control of credit distribution) was not reliably known, a non- 
probabilistic sampling method was followed; a purposive sampling technique was 
used.  
 
Only respondents with credit administration knowledge and working under credit 
/loan department of commercial banks were included in the sample of 204 
respondents. G power software was used in calculating the sample size since the 
population was not known with reliability. Input parameter in G power were, α err 
prob= 0.05, power (1-β err prob) = 0.8, odd ratio = 0.6, two tail test, normal 
distribution and the output result for the sample size is 204.  
 
3.7  Pre-Testing of Questionnaire 
Pre-testing was conducted in circumstances that were as similar as possible to actual 
data collection and on population members as similar as possible to those sampled. 
Prior to actual commercial banks survey, pre-testing the questionnaire was conducted 
using a total of 20 credit officers from 3 different commercial banks, which was 
almost 10% of the total sample size.Sudman (1983), prominent methodologist made 
similar judgement, he suggested 20-50 cases to be sufficient in discovering major 
errors in a questionnaire. The selected credit officers were very cooperative, filled 
well the questionnaires and provided sufficient information. There were no flaws in 
the questionnaires and thus, they were ready for actual data collection. 
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3.8 Data Analysis 
3.8.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Primary data were analyzedquantitatively. The first specific objective was analyzed 
through descriptive statistics and correlation analysis method. Figures, numbersand 
frequency distribution tables were used in the process of identifying and describing 
different CGSs that might be used by commercial banks. Correlation analysis was 
used to establish relationship of CGSs and also elements of each TC category. Some 
parameter values were expressed in percentages to facilitate comparison. This was 
done with aid of SPSS software, version 16.0. 
3.8.2  Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
In the theory of multiple linear regression, there are P explanatory variables and the 
relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables is represented 
by the following equation; 
Yi = βo+β1X1i+β2X2i +… + βpXpi + ei.......................................................................... 1 
Predication equation will be; 
Yi = βo+β1X1i+β2X2i +… + βpXpi…………….…………………………...……….…2 
When ei = 0 
β0 is the constant term and β1 to βp are the coefficients relating the p explanatory 
variables of interest. So multiple linear regression can be thought of an extension of 
simple linear regression. Examples of cases where multiple linear regression may be 
used, include;  trying to predict an individual income given several socio-economic 
characteristics or trying to predict the overall examination performance of pupils in 
A level given values of a set of exam scores etc, as suggested by Bryman and Cramer 
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(1990). The most critical assumption of multiple linear regression analysis that has 
been tested whenever the model was used in the current study was multicollinearity. 
First and second hypotheses for this study, were constructed from first and second 
specific objectives respectively. Correlation analysis technique was used to test the 
first hypothesis. Linear regression analysis was used to analyze the second specific 
objective and test the second hypothesis. Cost elements for each category of 
transaction costs were used as predictors (independent variables) against total 
transaction cost as dependent variable. Thus influence of each transaction costs 
category on total transaction cost was assessed. Multiple linear regression analysis 
was used to identify the relationship between dependent variable (total transaction 
costs) and a combination of independent variables (costs elements for each 
transaction costs category). The following general equation of multiple linear 
regressions was utilized for this study; 
TTC = β0 +β1TSCi + β2TNCi + β3TECi + εi…………………………………………3 
Where εi usually equated to zero and hence predication equation was; 
TTC = β0 +β1TSCi + β2TNCi + β3TECi………………………………..…………..4 
Where; 
TTC= Total Transaction costs (Tsh) 
TSC=Information search costs (Tsh) 
TNC=Credit contracts negotiation costs (Tsh) 
TEC=Credit contracts enforcement costs (Tsh) 
β1-3 >0 
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3.8.3 Logistic Regression Analysis 
Given a sample of (X, Y) pairs in logistic regression, the X’s can be numerical or 
categorical, but Y’s are generally coded as 0 (for those which do not have the event) 
or 1 (for those which have the event). According to Bryman and Cramer (1990), the 
logistic model is based on a linear relationship between the natural logarithm (ln) of 
the odds of an event and a numerical independent variable. The form of this 
relationship is as follows: 
ܮ = In (P/1-P)= β0 +β1x+ εi…………..……………………………………………….5 
Where Y is binary and represent the event of interest (response), coded as 0/1 for 
failure/success, 
P is the proportion of successes, 
0 is the odds of the event, 
L is the ln (odds of event), 
X is the independent variable, 
0 and 1 are the Y-intercept and the slope, respectively, and 
εiis the random error. 
 
Computations of the estimates of ߚ0ܽ݊݀ߚ1 in logistic regression are far more 
complicated, P is the probability of the event, and then the odds of the event are:  
Odds = 0 = P/ 1-P……………………………………………………………………6 
We defined L = ln(odds of event Y), sometimes called the “log odds” or logit of Y. 
We can write L in terms of P, Probability (Y=1), as follows: 
 
L= In (0) = In (P/1-P) …………………………………………….…………….….7 
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The logistic regression model may be written in terms of P, the risk of event Y, 
assuming that L is a linear function of X as follows: 
P = eβ0 +β1x +e/1+eβ0 +β1x +e………………………………………………………….8 
Current study used logistic regression method for analysis of third specific objective 
and testing of hypothesis (c) and (d) of this study. Where transaction costs were 
predictors while CGSs were dependent variables (dichotomous). This tool assessed 
the likelihood of commercial banks choosing a particular CGS and not others given 
Transaction Costs. Every CGS (1-4) were equated as a function of transaction costs.  
 
This means each TC category was tested against each CGS to determine the 
likelihood of choosing or not a particular CGS. Thus for each TC tested across four 
CGS (CGS1-4), the most cost efficient governance structure was  revealed and 
recommended for scaling up. Variables of transaction costs determinants that were 
used in this study includes but not limited to borrowers distance, expected borrowing 
frequency(loyalty), customer reputation, loan amount, trust, collateral market value. 
The mathematical representation of the above: 
 
Whereby;     ܶܥ = (ܶܵܥ + ܶܰܥ + ܶܧܥ) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ….10 
And         
ܥܩܵ(1 − 4) = ݂(ܶܵܥ, ܶܰܥ, ܶܧܥ) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … ૚૚ 
TSC includes but not limited to transport, meetings, village authority fee, reputation, 
personal relationship, time spent in searching and screening borrower. TNC includes 
but not limited to cost of lawyers, allowances for meetings, paperwork, personal 
relationships, transport costs, levies, opportunity cost of time spent in negotiation, 
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reputation and TEC cost includes but not limited to penalties, enforcement 
campaigns, police and court case costs, time for making follow ups, cost of lawyers, 
reputation. Binomial logistic regression gave binary outcome. For example 1 
meaning success and 0 failure when predicting whether a CGS has been chosen or 
not based on TSC, TNC, and TEC.  The logistic regression model gives the 
likelihood that, given CGS’s TSC, TNC, TEC, that they are chosen (in this example, 
the higher the probability, the greater the chance for the CGS to be chosen). Again, a 
number of coefficients were obtained, but this time were used to calculate a LOGIT.  
As a general formula logit is given by; 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ ݋݂ ܥܩܵ(1 − 4) = ݅݊ݐ݁ݎܿ݁݌ݐ + ܽܶܵܥ + ܾܶܰܥ + ܿܶܧܥ + ℇ … … … … … … … … … ૚૛ 
Usually,  is equated to 0 since focus is on TSC (search costs), TNC (negotiation 
costs) and TEC (enforcement costs) as parameters used to predict the likelihood of 
choosing a particular CGS. Therefore; 
݈݋݃݅ݐ (݌) = log ൬
݌
1 − ݌
൰ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . .13 
Thus; 
݌ =
1
1 + ݁ ∗ −(݈݋݃݅ݐ)
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … … … … … 14  
So the model was fitted and get values for a, b, c and the intercept, logit value was 
calculated from given data. Thus the probability P was calculated and established 
chances (likelihood) of choosing a particular CGS. 
Multinomial logistic regression was also used to predict choice of an efficient CGS. 
Where the dependent variable has four different options (CGS1-CGS4) matched 
against categories of transaction costs, at each time, one option of dependent variable 
was set as a reference category. Agresti (1990) explainedthat multinomial Logistic 
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Regression is the linear regression analysis conducted when the dependent variable is 
nominal with more than two levels.  Thus it is an extension of logistic regression, 
which analyzes dichotomous (binary) dependents.  Multinomial logistic regression 
analysis assumed that, all four credit governance structures (CGS1-CGS4) existed, 
but at each time analysis was made, one CGS was used as a reference category and 
determined the CGS more likely to be selected given transaction costs. 
3.9  Analysis Models and Assumptions 
Current study utilized cross-sectional survey, thus all the data made available for 
analysis were cross-sectional data. Collections of data were made from different 
sampling units but at the same period of time. Cross-sectional data do not need 
statistical control as time series data do. Multiple linear regression of cross-sectional 
data, normally call for testing of multicollinearity problem, to avoid significant 
predictors to influence each other and jeopardize results. Current study applied 
correlation matrix method for multicollinearity test, when multiple linear regression 
model was used.  
Current study applied logistic regression methods for analysis, binary logistic and 
multinomial logistic. These methods uses maximum likelihood estimator which 
provides consistency approach to parameter estimation problems. Maximum 
likelihood estimates can be developed for a large variety of estimation situations. For 
example, they can be applied in reliability analysis to censored data under various 
censoring models.  Normally maximum likelihood estimator is not affected by data 
quality to impair results and call for assumption testing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CREDIT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
CATEGORIES 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
With reference to current study specific objectives (a), this chapter identified and 
described CGSs that might be used by commercial banks to absorb transaction costs. 
Major categories of transaction costs as well as their cost elements were identified 
and described.Hypothesis (a) of the current study was tested in this chapter. Through 
descriptive statistics alternative credit governance structures (CGSs) were compared, 
related to their associated costs and customer categories they served. 
 
4.2 Alternative Modes of Governance Structure for CBCredit Supply 
From the framework described in figure 4.1, there are four different categories of 
governance structure CGS1 to CGS4; these may be used by commercial banks to 
mitigate TCs and distribute credits in the URT. Each CGS has its own associated 
level of TC, depending on the choice of a CGS for credit distribution to borrowers. 
The level of TCinfluence the choice ofCGS for credit supply by commercial bank 
under different circumstances. Therefore TSC, TNC and TEC, were independent 
input variables that affects choice of CGS.  
 
Commercial banks in Tanzania offer MSMEs credits, personal loans/credits, 
corporate credits to companies and agriculture credits. Any credit transaction carried 
out under each credit governance structure involves transaction costs (search costs, 
contract negotiation cost and contract enforcement cost) that if over looked may 
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result in high costs, inefficiency in operations of commercial banks and hence no 
transaction at all. Current study findings, proved commercial banks failure to identify 
the most efficient credit governance structure that might assist them expanding their 
operations to rural areas where majority of people (potential customers) in need of 
financial services live.  
 
Figure 4.1:Alternative Credit Governance Structures 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
Whereby: 
DR   Direct channel (Credits directly from commercial banks to ultimate borrower) 
CB   stands for commercial bank 
BR   is ultimate borrower (user of credits)  
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TC   is transaction costs (Tsh) 
PIB is profit- Intermediary bank; i.e. Community development banks 
PIM is profit Intermediary microfinance Institution i.e. SACCOS 
NPI is non-profit intermediary i.e. government institutions that guarantee credits 
from CB to employees. 
CGS   stands for credit governance structure. 
 
4.3 Preference of CGSs by Commercial Banks in Tanzania 
Table 4.1shows how 204 respondents from 34 commercial banks in Tanzania prefer 
distributing credits, using various credit governance structures (CGSs). 66.2% of all 
respondents from commercial banks in Tanzania prefer distributing credits directly to 
individuals rather than using intermediaries. Only 5.9% preferred using profit 
making intermediary banks, i.e. community development banks as channel of 
distributing credits to borrowers. 16.7% of respondents from commercial banks in 
the country prefer issuing credits to borrowers through profit making microfinance 
institutions like SACCOS.  
 
The remaining 11.2% mostly prefer servicing credits through non-profit making 
intermediaries. As findings described in Table 4.1 show, only 33.8% of all 
respondents from commercial banks in the country can service credits through 
intermediaries. The rest of commercial bank’s respondents believe it’s costly and 
inefficient for them to use intermediaries in supplying credits. 
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Table 4.1:Preference of CGSs by Respondents from Commercial Banks in 
Tanzania 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
From facts given by most respondents from commercial banks in Tanzania, most 
borrowers portrayed adverse characteristics in relation to borrowing. Poor individual 
and business reputation, most of those in need of credits were situated in remote 
areas of the country, thus reaching them was costly. Most borrowers lack credit 
collateral or guarantor, and those with collateral have low market value and hence 
discredit their credit worthiness and pose multiple risks of loss to credit suppliers. 
The amount of credit needed was usually small while borrowing frequency (loyalty) 
was not assured and therefore the level of trust of commercial banks towards 
majority borrowers was very low. These findings can be further elaborated in Table 
4.2 where average total transaction costs (ATTC) matched with transaction costs 
determinants. 
 
From study findings, current credit business operating environment force most 
commercial banks to prefer credit governance structure one (CGS1). Preference of 
CGS1 supports servicing of credits to urban based customers and not rural based 
customers since it carries lower transaction costs when used in urban areas. Majority 
of those in need of credit services are located in rural and not urban areas inTanzania. 
CGSs Frequency Percentage (%) 
CGS1 135 66.2 
CGS2 12 5.9 
CGS3 34 16.7 
CGS4 23 11.2 
Total 204 100.0 
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Given current credit business operating environment, usage of CGS1 to supply 
credits to rural based customers, results to high transaction costs that most 
commercial banks cannot afford to absorb, thus renders them inefficient in terms of 
transaction costs. For the purpose of credit business scale up, efficiency and credit 
facility accessibility given the current non conducive credit business operating 
environment, commercial banks should prefer more indirect channels for credit 
supply (CGS2-4), rather than CGS1. 
 
Findings from Table 5.10, showed that 97.6% of respondents from all commercial 
banks in Tanzania prefer dealing with urban based customers as far as credit business 
is concerned. Arguments behind their decision is inaccessibility of rural areas due to 
poor infrastructure and other supportive facilities, difficulties in identifying, locating 
and accessing information of rural based customers and therefore resulted in further 
difficulties in monitoring and enforcing credit contracts with most rural based 
customers. Above reasons, highly contributed to massive rise of credit transaction 
costs that most commercial banks cannot afford to absorb when using CGS1. Since 
they prefer dealing directly with borrowers, most opted not to provide credit services 
at all to rural based customers to avoid high transaction costs and thus dealt more 
with urban based customer.  
 
High preference of urban based customers, supported commercial banks preference 
of CGS1.  Usage of CGS1 by commercial banks on urban based customers assisted 
them to attain optimality but not efficiency since they minimize transaction costs but 
failed to scale up their credit operations to rural part of the country where majority of 
those in serious need of credits live. Given current non conducive credit business 
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operating environment, high preference of CGS1 by commercial banks limits their 
ability to expand their credit operations to rural areas, thus renders them inefficient in 
terms of transaction costs despite the fact that, they economize when dealing with 
few urban based customer. 
 
Table 4.2: Transaction Cost Determinants Contribution on TTC 
Trust Reputation Remoteness 
 
Collateral/guar
antor 
 Market value 
of collateral 
 Borrowing 
frequency Credit amount 
TTC Mean TTC Mean TTC Mean TTC Mean TTC Mean TTC Mean TTC Mean 
10,380,118.78 12,003,234.05 11,050,578.14 19,227,016.74 31,160,202.74 31,045,826.5 31040781.87 
 
Table 4.2shows findings given by 204 respondents from all commercial banks in the 
country. According to the findings low trust level of banks on borrowers, poor 
borrower’sreputation and remoteness of borrowers led to TTC Mean of 
TSH10,380,118.78,TSH12,003,234.05 and TSH11,050,578.14 respectively. These 
were not highly contributing factors as compared to availability of credit collateral 
which led to TTC mean of TSH19,227,016.74 which is almost as twice as the TTC 
mean of any of the preceding determinants.  
 
Moreover these findings further shows, commercial banks credit transaction costs 
were not highly affected by trust on borrowers, borrower’s reputation or remoteness 
of borrowers. Factors that highly contributes to rise of commercial banks credit 
transaction costs in Tanzania includes market value of borrowers collaterals, 
expected borrowing frequency (loyalty) and the credit amount, their TTC mean 
isTsh31,160,202.74,Tsh31,045,826.5 and Tsh31,040,781.87 respectively.  
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These findings suggests, the major reasons for commercial banks concentration in 
urban areas as far as transaction costs is concerned to be, lack collateral or reputable 
credit guarantors for rural based customers, those with collateral, their market value 
is very low, rural based customers borrowing frequency is not assured and also, 
usually the amount of credit needed by rural based customers is very small. Most of 
urban based customers, have high market value collateral, they are reputable, loyal 
since they can easily be identified and located and often borrows large sums of 
money and therefore, they are highly preferred by most commercial banks in 
Tanzania. 
 
According to National Bureau of Statistics census report of 2012, 70.4% of 
Tanzanians live in rural areas, thus majority of those in need of credits are located in 
rural part of the country, where above features/determinants are adversely dominant. 
Given these facts, commercial banks concentrate in urban areas when it comes to 
credit provision. Since it’s very costly transacting with borrowers from rural areas 
due to presence of adverse features that are causing transaction costs to rise rapidly 
as seen in Table 4.2. 
 
4.4 Comparison of Credit Governance Structures (CGS1-CGS4) 
Four different credit governance structures (CGSs) were analyzed in this study. 
When commercial banks provide credits directly to individual borrower. Commercial 
banks provide credits to profit making intermediary banks that ultimately deal with 
individual borrowers. Commercial banks provides credits to profit making 
intermediary microfinance institutions that eventually deal with individual borrowers 
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and the fourth CGS is when commercial bank provides credits to non-profit making 
intermediaries.  
 
The cost of carrying out credit transactions using indirect channels (CGS2-CGS4) is 
often high due to presence of intermediaries, especially to borrowers. Such costs can 
be absorbed by intermediaries within the particular CGS and not commercial banks. 
Therefore commercial banks are better off using indirect channels for credit 
distribution rather than direct channel. 
 
Table 4.3:Total Transaction Costs for CGS1-CGS4  
N  Minimum Maximum Mean 
204 Total costs for CGS1  1590000 16100000 2392600 
204 Total costs for CGS2 1640000 16000000 2662500 
204 Total costs for CGS3 1230000 7110000 4436400 
204 Total costs for CGS4 1650000 20100000 11313000 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
Given the descriptive analysis from Table 4.3, transaction costs from four CGSs have 
been analyzed. Maximum transaction costs from CGS1 isTsh16,100,000, while from 
CGS2, CGS3 and CGS4 is Tsh 16,000,000, Tsh 7,110,000 and Tsh20,100,000 
respectively. The maximum cost for credit governance structure 3 is better-off 
compared to the rest of the channels, despite that fact commercial banks makes 
decision of an appropriate channel by comparing average transaction costs. Mean 
transaction costs for CGS1 isTsh2,392,600 which is lower compared to the rest of 
the Credit governance structures, where CGS2 is Tsh 2,662,500, CGS3 is Tsh 
4,436,400 and CGS4 is Tsh11,313,000. 
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Therefore most commercial banks prefer CGS1 due the fact that it carries lower 
transaction costs compared to the rest of CGSs and it gives them direct control of 
credit supply. These facts are supported by findings from Table 5.10 that showed 
97.6% of commercial banks prefer urban based customers for the purpose of 
lowering TC since they also prefer CGS1 which is not suitable for credit operations 
with rural based customers due to high transaction costs which they will have to 
absorb themselves. 
 
Table 4.4:Correlations for Total Costs of CGS1-CGS4 
  TCCGS1 TCCGS2 TCCGS3 TCCGS4 
TCCGS1 PC 1 .941** -.532** -.475** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
TCCGS2 PC .941** 1 -.315** -.248** 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
TCCGS3 PC -.532** -.315** 1 .991** 
Sig. .000 .000  .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
TCCGS4 PC -.475** -.248** .991** 1 
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.000 level (2-tailed). 
 
Findings in Table 4.4 reveals further relationship that exists among credit governance 
structures. Total cost for credit governance structure one(TCCGS1) and total cost for 
credit governance structure two(TCCGS2) are strongly positively correlated (direct 
related) at r=0.941. When preference of CGS1 is high, preference of CGS2 will also 
be high since they share a strong similar magnitude. TCCGS1 and TCCGS3 are 
inversely related at r= -0.532, when the cost of CGS1 increases, the cost of CGS3 
decreases, therefore CGS3 will be more preferred than CGS1 and vice versa. 
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TCCGS2 and TCCGS3 both shares strong magnitude with TCCGS1 since the 
relationship they share with TCCGS1 is strong despite the fact that one is positive 
and the other one is negative.TCCGS1 and TCCGS4 have weak but negative 
relationship at r= -0.475. TCCGS2 compared to TCCGS3 and TCCGS4 have weak 
but negative relationship at r= -0.315 and r= -0.248 respectively. TCCGS3 and 
TCCGS4 have strong positive relationship at r= 0.991. The findings shows that, there 
is a direct relationship between CGS1 and CGS2 as well there is a direct relationship 
between CGS3 and CGS4, by implication commercial banks that preferred CGS1 
also preferred CGS2 but not CGS3 or CGS4. And when CGS3 is preferred also 
CGS4 is preferred but not CGS1 and CGS2. Thus findings are suggesting 
commercial banks can only use two CGSs at once, using more than two CGSs is too 
costly for them to handle. Therefore the null hypothesis that, there is no relationship 
between total costs for CGS1 and CGS2 is rejected. The alternative hypothesis is 
accepted since they strongly positively related. 
 
4.5 CGSs and their Associated Transaction Costs 
In Table 4.5comparison has been made, where each credit governance structure 
(CGS) has been matched with its associated transaction costs. From the findings, 
average total transaction costs for each governance structure has been ascertained 
and compared to determine a CGS that economizes in terms of transaction costs. 
Table 4.5:CGSs and Transaction Costs 
 
CGS1 CGS2 CGS3 CGS4 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Total transaction costs 15,561,442.77 31,160,506.00 31,043,669.15 31,040,781.87 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
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From Table 4.5 all four CGSs have been compared against their average transaction 
cost. Results showed, when the comparison is made between the CGSs against 
associated transaction costs, CGS1 has lower average total transaction costs almost 
half of the averages of each CGSs. The ATTC for CGS1, CGS2, CGS3, and CGS4 is 
recorded at Tsh15,561,442.77, Tsh31,160,506.00, Tsh31,043,669.15 and 
Tsh31,040,781.87 respectively. According to transaction costs theory, when the costs 
of transacting between two or more parties is too high to be absorbed, it renders such 
parties inefficient in terms of transaction costs, sometimes it may result to no 
transaction at all.  
 
Commercial banks in Tanzania prefer dealing with borrowers directly (CGS1) 
compared to other indirect channels (CGS2-CGS4) of distributing credits for urban 
based customers. Preference of CGS1 by commercial banks in Tanzania has an 
adverse effect when it comes to rural based credit customers. Inability of commercial 
banks to supply credits to most part of the country is the result of preference of 
CGS1. Commercial banks are too sensitive to costs and risk of losses, thus CGS1 is 
their most safe way of distributing credits. According to transaction cost theory, they 
may be economizing transaction costs but in real world, they are inefficient, because 
they can only provide credit services to some few credit worth customers situated in 
urban areas. 
 
4.6 Customer Categories and Credit Governance Structures 
As evidenced in section 4.3, most commercial banks prefer servicing credits to 
customers through CGS1 due to low transaction costs involved. In Table 4.1, 
66.2%of respondents from commercial banks favor distributing credits using CGS1. 
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Findings from Table 4.6, proved that majority of commercial banks credit customers 
were intended to be served using credit governance structure one (CGS1). Such 
customers include but not limited to registered SMEs, individual persons, informal 
and micro businesses, large and small scale farmers (sundry customers) and 
community development banks (only few were actually reached due to high 
transaction costs associated with CGS1). These were the main credit customers for 
most commercial banks in Tanzania. 
 
Table 4.6:Credit Governance Structures and Customer Categories 
Credit governance structures Customer categories served Percentage (%) 
CGS1 Sundry customers 44.1 
Community development banks 48.5 
Others 7.4 
CGS2 Community development banks 19.6 
Public institutions 76.5 
Non-bank microfinance institutions 2.0 
Other commercial banks 1.5 
Others 0.4 
CGS3 Non-bank microfinance institutions 96.6 
Other commercial banks 2.9 
NGOs 0.5 
CGS4 NGOs 7.0 
Religious institutions 90.7 
Others 2.3 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
The above mentioned credit customers covers about 92.6% of all credit customers 
that were being serviced using CGS1. Despite of CGS1 serving diverse groups of 
customers, it was only effective where such customers were urban based and not 
rural based. Since it hinders scale up of credit operations due to high and un-
absorbed transaction costs associated with credit distribution to rural areas of 
Tanzania given current non-conducive credit business operating environment. 
Majority of those in serious need of credit facility were not reached due to preference 
of CGS1. 
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96.1% of all commercial banks credits served through CGS2 were directed to 
community developments banks and public institutions and 3.9% of the remaining 
credit proportion was directed to non-bank microfinance institutions, other 
commercial banks and all other remaining categories of customersthat were not 
mentioned in Table 4.6. 96.6% ofcredits distributed by commercial banks in 
Tanzania through CGS3 were mainly directed to non-bank microfinance institutions. 
In 2001 the national microfinance policy was formulated with an intention of 
supporting microfinance institutions in the country, in particular non-bank 
microfinance institutions so as to fasten socio-economic development. 
 
Commercial banks opened a micro financing window for this purpose, but only a few 
large domestic commercial banks truly support microfinance institutions in the 
country.Commercial banks give credits to non-profit making intermediaries that 
ultimately deal with individual borrowers in CGS4. This channel was specifically 
designed to be used by commercial banks to supply credits to non-profit making 
organization, such as religious institutions, clubs and other associations that do not 
make profit.  90.7% of all commercial banks credits serviced through CGS4, were 
directed to religious organization, 7% to NGOs and the remaining 2.3% to other 
categories of customers not mentioned. 
 
4.7 Categories of Total Transaction Costs 
From transaction cost theory, especially the one stipulated by Williamson (2010) in 
new institutional economics, transaction costs are divided into three categories (i) 
Information search costs (ii) Contract negotiation costs (ii) Contract monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Findings from current study similarly evidenced the same 
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transaction costs categories, but these costs differ from one another depending on 
influence of individual transaction costs determinants within each cost category. 
Some determinants were dominant than others, like cost of time and transport cost in 
the current study. 
 
Table 4.7:Transaction Costs Categories 
N  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
204 Total search costs 663000 6880000 3535300 2001980 
204 Total negotiation costs 852000 4030000 2894300 931803 
204 Total enforcement costs 3320000 45500000 14375000 7931510 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
From Table 4.7,credit contracts monitoring and enforcement costs was very high, 
more than twice combination of both costs of searching borrowers information and 
credit contracts negotiation costs, while TNC was the lowest. This is a clear 
indication of poor borrowing and repayment behavior of borrowers in Tanzania. 
Most borrowers do not have tangible reason for borrowing, thus instead of using the 
money to facilitate growth of income generating activities, the money is being 
diverted to other uses which resulted to failure of making repayments.  
 
Commercial banks are very sensitive to risks of losses, especially those originating 
from credit business operations since it is one of the major income generating 
activities of banks in Tanzania. With that in mind, commercial banks invest heavily 
in debt collection so as to minimize or completely avoid losses from non-repayments 
of credits by defaulters. Commercial banks in Tanzania invest more in provision of 
credit facility to few customers in urban areas, that they consider credit worth, in turn 
considerable number of such customers became defaulters.  
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The newly established Credit Reference Bureau (CRB) is not effectively functioning. 
It still lack so much information of borrowers in the country and therefore difficult to 
determine whether the customer is credible or not. Thus most commercial banks 
enter into credit contracts with customers that are neither trust worthy nor reputable 
and lead to default. Due to that fact, commercial banks spent so much costs to 
monitor and enforce credit contracts, to make sure non repayment is reduced if 
possible avoided. 
 
4.7.1 Elements of Total Search Costs 
In Table 4.8, five different variables were used to determine the total search 
transaction costs, distance (transport cost), time, local authority fees, meetings 
facilitation costs, tips and other related charges. According to the findings, transport 
cost isTsh1,200,800 which is higher than other determinants, followed by costs of 
time at Tsh963,430, local authority fees at Tsh545,100, tips and other charges at 
Tsh535,890and the lowest was meetings facilitation cost at Tsh290,100. The mean 
cost alone is not satisfactory to conclude that, transport cost is the best predictor for 
total search cost, therefore correlation analysis was opted. 
 
Table 4.8:Elements of Total Search Costs 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
N  
Mean Std. Deviation 
204  Total Transport costs. 1200800 865053 
204 Total costs of time  963430 669766 
204 Total local authority fees 545100 471847 
204 Total meetings facilitation costs  290100 670730 
204 Tips and other charges 535890 104976 
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Underdevelopment of infrastructure in the country is one of the major reason for 
high transport costs during borrower’s information search by commercial banks. 
Also poor planning of town and cities, made difficult for commercial banks to reach 
most customers and thus raise costs. Currently there is no automated systems for 
identification and searching of potential borrowers information, for example, the 
National identification system which will be linked to several other automated 
systems of health, tax authorities, banks, insurance and pension funds, voting 
systems as few examples.  
 
Therefore commercial banks search most of its credit customers manually, which is 
very costly. As a result, so much time is spent in the process of searching borrower’s 
information so as to be assured of their credibility to avoid risks of default.If the 
government would embark its efforts on improving infrastructure facilities, properly 
design and plan its town and cities, effectively automate its National Identification 
System and linked it with other systems, would results in minimization of costs for 
searching borrower’s information and other related transaction costs currently 
incurred by commercial banks in credit operations. 
 
From the correlation matrix of predictors for total search costs, the correlation 
coefficient (r) between time costs and transport costs is 0.791, which support strong 
positive relationship between variables, that is, if transport cost increases during 
searching of borrower’s information, the cost of time will also rise for almost similar 
magnitude and vice versa. Transport costs and local authority fees share a strong 
positive relationship at r=0.985, if one variable increases or decreases, the other one 
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will respond in a similar way. Cost of time during borrowers information search and 
local authority fees have strong positive relationship at r=0.766. 
 
Table 4.9:Correlation Matrix for Elements of Total Search Cost 
  Total transport 
cost. 
Total costs of 
time 
Total local 
authority fees 
Total meetings 
facilitation costs 
Total tips and 
other charges 
Total transport 
cost. 
PC 1 .791** .985** .252** .738** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 
Total costs of time  PC .791** 1 .766** .347** .593** 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 
Total local 
authority fees 
PC .985** .766** 1 .219** .761** 
Sig. .000 .000  .002 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 
Total meetings 
facilitation costs 
PC .252** .347** .219** 1 .126 
Sig. .000 .000 .002  .073 
N 204 204 204 204 204 
Total tips and other 
charges  
PC .738** .593** .761** .126 1 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .073  
N 204 204 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.000 level (2-tailed). 
PC is Pearson correlation 
 
The relationship that exists between cost of time, transport costs and meeting 
facilitation costs during searching for borrowers information is weak but positive at 
r=0.347 and r= 0.252 respectively. If transport cost or cost of time increase, cost of 
meeting facilitation will also increase but the magnitude will be weak. Total tips and 
other charges have strong positive relationship with transport costs and the costs of 
time at r=0.738 and 0.593 respectively. As well total tips and other charges have 
positive strong correlation with local authority fees at r= 0.766 and shares a weak but 
positive relationship with meetings facilitation costs at r=0.126, influence of 
individual variable is weak. 
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To avoid problem of multicollinearity, only one variable was selected among 
variables with strong relationship with each other, the rest were omitted, for this case 
time variable was selected since it has been reflected in the current study hypothesis. 
Time variable has strong correlation with, transport costs, local authority fees and 
Tips variables and thus were omitted from the analysis. Only time and meetings 
facilitation variables were taken as predictors so as to give credible and reliable 
results since their relationship is weak at r= 0.347. 
 
Table 4.10:Actual Predictors for Total Information Search Costs 
  
Total costs of time 
Total meetings 
facilitation  
cost 
Total search 
costs 
Total costs of time  PC 1 .347** .899** 
Sig.   .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 
Total meetings facilitation  cost PC .347** 1 .317** 
Sig .000  .000 
N 204 204 204 
Total search costs Pearson Correlation .899** .317** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
PC is Pearson correlation 
 
From the findings in Table 4.10, the correlation between time variable and total 
search costs is strong positive relationship at r= 0.899, time cost during information 
search positively influence total information search costs, thus any change to time 
cost variable leads to almost similar change to total search costs in similar direction. 
Correlation between meetings facilitation cost variable and total search costs is weak 
but positive correlation at r=0.317. Meetings facilitation costs have weak influence 
on changes of total information search costs. 
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If all variables (tips and other charges, local authority fees, transport costs) and time 
were used to gather the credibility and reliability of results could have been tempered 
with. Time costs variable is of interest to this study, it has been reflected to the study 
hypotheses and that’s why it was taken for further analysis instead of transport costs, 
tips or local authority fees variable, these variables have almost similar magnitude as 
time cost variable, if any one was used could have ended up with almost similar 
results as time cost variable did. 
 
4.7.2 Elements of Total Negotiation Costs 
Findings in Table 4.11, descriptive analysis shows the mean cost for time variable to 
be higher compared to the rest of variables at Tsh 1,174,500, while that of meetings 
facilitation costs, tips and lawyer fees to be Tsh 293,170, Tsh798,560 and 
Tsh628,090 respectively. Thus from the data, time cost variable influences more total 
negotiation costs compared to the rest of variables. 
 
Table 4.11:Elements of Total Negotiation Costs 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
 
In correlation matrix, given by Table 4.12, all four predictors were compared, the 
correlation coefficient between time cost variable and meeting facilitation costs is 
weak but positive at r=0.382, they both qualify for the next stage of analysis since 
their correlation is not strong. The correlation of time cost variable and total tips and 
other charge is strong but positive at r= 0.485 which is equivalent to r= 0.5, since the 
N  Mean Std. Deviation 
204 Total costs of time 1174500 597525 
204 Total meeting facilitation costs  293170 83088 
204 Total tips and other charges  798560 315993 
204 Total lawyer fees  628090 247120 
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relationship is strong, each variable can influence the other, thus one variable has to 
be removed to avoid impairment of results through multicollinearity problem, for this 
case, the variable to be removed is tips and other charges since time variable is of 
interest to the current study.  
 
The relationship between time cost variable and lawyer fees was also established, 
they have weak relationship but positive at r=0.167, thus moved to next stage of 
analysis. Meetings facilitation costs and tips and other charges have weak but 
positive relationship at r=0.405, despite the fact that tips and other charges has 
already been removed from next stage analysis. Meetings facilitation costs and 
lawyer fees have positive but weak relationship at r=0.154, they have both been used 
in next stage of analysis.Three predictors (time cost, meetings facilitation costs and 
lawyer fees) were involved in the next stage analysis with total credit negotiation 
costs as dependent variable. 
PC is Pearson correlation 
Table 4.12:  Correlation Matrix for Elements of Total Negotiation Costs 
  
Costs of time 
Meeting 
facilitation 
costs 
    Tips&other 
charges      Lawyer fees 
Costs of time  PC 1 .382** .485** .167* 
Sig.  .000 .000 .017 
N 204 204 204 204 
Meeting facilitation costs  PC .382** 1 .405** .154* 
Sig.  .000  .000 .028 
N 204 204 204 204 
Tips and other charges  PC .485** .405** 1 .290** 
Sig.  .000 .000  .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
Lawyer fees  PC .167* .154* .290** 1 
Sig.  .017 .028 .000  
N 204 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.000 level (2-tailed).    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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From Table 4.13, the correlation between time cost variable and total negotiation 
costs as dependent variable is strong positive at r=0.884. The influence of time costs 
variable on total negotiation costs is very significant, where any change in time cost 
variable will significantly change total negotiation costs in similar direction. Total 
meetings facilitation costs variable has a strong positive correlation with total 
negotiation costs at r=0.512, thus it strongly influence changes in total negotiation 
costs despite the fact that its magnitude is not high as time cost variable. Total lawyer 
fees also positively and significantly influence the total credit negotiation costs 
where the coefficient r=0.484 which is approximately to r=0.5. Therefore both three 
predictors, time costs, meetings facilitation costs and lawyer fees strongly, positively 
and significantly influences the total credit negotiation costs. 
 
Table 4.13:Actual Predictors of Total Negotiation Costs 
PC is Pearson correlation 
 
  
Total costs of 
time 
Total meeting 
facilitation costs 
Total lawyer 
fees 
Total 
negotiation 
costs 
Total costs of time  PC 1 .382** .167* .884** 
Sig.   .000 .017 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
Total meeting facilitation costs  PC 
.382** 1 .154* .512** 
Sig.  .000  .028 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
Total lawyer fees  PC .167* .154* 1 .484** 
Sig.  .017 .028  .000 
N 204 204 204 204 
Total negotiation costs PC .884** .512** .484** 1 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.000 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.7.3 Elements of Total Enforcement Costs 
From the findings in Table 4.14, total enforcement costs is higher compared to total 
information search costs or total credit contracts negotiation costs. In total 
monitoring and enforcement costs, there are many variables that accumulate costs 
than the other two costs categories. Only three variables, credit contract breach costs, 
Case filing costs and third party costs, their total average costs isTsh 1,750,500, Tsh 
4,270,200, Tsh 7,133,800 respectively. These averages summations equal to Tsh 
13,154,500 which is more than total of transaction costs averages of all determinants 
for total information search costs and total credit contacts negotiation costs. 
Commercial banks invest heavily on monitoring and enforcement of credit contracts 
to avoid risk of default and non-repayments, as a results of making wrong decisions 
when it comes to choice of an appropriate CGS for credit distribution. 
 
Table 4.14:Elements of Total Enforcement Costs 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
Furthermore, the findings in Table 4.14 shows that, total thirdparty costs (the costs 
incurred by banks to hire third partiesto monitor and enforce credits contracts on 
their behalf) wasTsh 7,133,800, which is higher than any other determinant of 
monitoring and enforcement costs. These are the consequences faced by 
N  Mean Std. Deviation 
204 Transport costs  588170 315599 
204 Cost of time  131170 100230 
204 Food& refreshment costs  167060 269069 
204 Business viability costs 334210 137759 
204 Contracts breach costs 1750500 647357 
204 Case filing costs  4270200 3758550 
204 Third party costs  7133800 3207970 
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commercialbanks for their preference of CGS1. Findings from Table 4.1 showed that 
66.2% of all commercial banks prefer distributing credits through CGS1, thus 
dealing directly with individual borrowers, as a result tend to multiply monitoring 
and enforcement costs. If CGS2, CGS3, CGS4 were opted, such costs would have 
been shifted to intermediaries. Commercial banks are very sensitive to risks, in order 
for them to manage higher risks of default and non-repayment of credits, they incur 
costs to hire third parties which could have otherwise been avoided if indirect 
channels for supplying credits were used. 
 
Table 4.15:Relationship of Predictors for Total Enforcement Costs 
  
Transport 
costs Cost of time 
Food& 
refreshment 
costs 
business 
viability 
Contracts 
breach 
Case filing 
costs 
Total third 
party costs  
Transport costs  PC 
1 .694** .514** .865** .735** .726** .703** 
Sig.   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Cost of time  PC 
.694** 1 .487** .585** .895** .878** .873** 
Sig.  .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Food& refreshment 
costs  
PC 
.514** .487** 1 .446** .511** .438** .517** 
Sig.  .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
business viability  PC 
.865** .585** .446** 1 .584** .601** .585** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Contracts breach PC 
.735** .895** .511** .584** 1 .886** .879** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Case filing costs  PC 
.726** .878** .438** .601** .886** 1 .979** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Total third party 
costs  
PC 
.703** .873** .517** .585** .879** .979** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
PC is Pearson correlation 
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From Table 4.15, the relationship that exists between transport costs variable and 
cost of time variable is strong positive at r=0.694, both variables cannot be taken for 
further analysis, thus cost of time is selected since it is of more interest to the study. 
Cost of time and food& refreshments cost variables have a weak but positive 
relationship at r=0.484, they are both accepted for further analysis. The relationship 
between cost of time and business viability variable is strong positive correlation at 
r= 0.585, thus business viability costs variable is left out in the next stage analysis to 
avoid impairment of results. 
 
Not only that but also all the remaining variable, cost of breaching credit contracts, 
case filing costs and third party costs variables have strong positive correlation with 
the cost of time variable at r= 0.895, r= 0.878, r=0.873 respectively. Therefore they 
were all omitted from the next stage analysis.Only two variables were taken for 
further analysis since they have weak relationship, that is costs of time and food and 
refreshment costs, their r coefficient was 0.4. The rest of variables, their coefficient 
of correlation was greater than 0.5 which approaches to 1. 
 
Table 4.16:Actual Predictors of Total Enforcement Costs 
  
Cost of time 
Refreshment 
costs 
Enforcement 
costs 
Cost of time  PC 1 .487** .895** 
Sig.   .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 
Refreshment costs  PC .487** 1 .496** 
Sig.  .000  .000 
N 204 204 204 
Enforcement costs PC .895** .496** 1 
Sig.  .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
PC is Pearson correlation 
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The findings in Table 4.16evidenced strong and positive relationship between time 
variable and total enforcement costs at r= 0.895. Cost of time variable have high 
influence to total enforcement and monitoring costs,any increase or decrease in time 
variable will lead to increase or decrease in total enforcement costs of almost similar 
magnitude.A number of variables like credit contract breaching costs, business 
viability measuring costs, case filing costs and thirdparty costs were left out from this 
analysis. 
 
Intention was to attain credibility and reliability of the results. Time cost variable 
was taken for further analysis since it has been reflected in the current study 
hypotheses and thus it is of interest in this study. If any of the above variable was 
used, could yield into similar results as time costs variable. The relationship of food 
and refreshment costs variable with the total enforcement is weak but positive at 
r=0.496, thus it also positively influence total enforcement costs but the magnitude of 
change is weak. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND CHOICE OF AN EFFICIENT CREDIT 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter critically examined specific objective b and c of the current study. 
Significant transaction costs determinants associated with CGSs of commercial 
banks were identified and analyzed.  Effects of transaction costs on choice of an 
efficient CGS for scale up of commercial banks credit operations were also assessed. 
Current study hypothesis (b), (c) and (d) were tested. Multiple linear regression 
model, both binary and multinomial logistic regression were used. Transaction costs 
as predictor was used to establish a choice of preference between direct and indirect 
channels for credit distribution and to establish a choice of urban or rural based credit 
customers by commercial banks. 
 
5.2 CausalityEffect on Total Transaction Costs (TTC) and Choice of an 
Efficient CGS 
In Table 5.1, variables used as determinants for total transaction costs in the current 
study were matched to test their relationship strength. Only those with weak relation 
were taken for further analysis, the rest were ignored to avoid jeopardize credibility 
and reliability of results. From table 5.1, there is a strong positive relationship 
between time variable of transaction cost and the rest of variables, such as transport 
costs, local authority fees, food and refreshment costs, costs for measuring 
borrower’s business viability, costs for breaching credit contracts, case filing costs, 
third party costsas well as tips and other charges.  
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Therefore, since they are strongly related and share similar magnitude, only one 
variable is taken to represent other variables, and for this case, time 
variable.Therefore, time variable and other variables that, have weaker relationship 
with, meeting facilitation costs, and lawyer fees in credit negotiation, were used in 
regression analysis below. The relationship between time cost and lawyer fees in 
contract negotiation is positive but weak at r= 0.249. When time variable increases, 
lawyer fees will also increase at a very low rate. There is also a positive relationship 
but weak at r= 0.491 between time variable and meeting facilitation costs, therefore 
lawyer fees and meeting facilitation costs variables do not have high influence on 
time costs variable. And the relationship between meeting facilitation costs and 
lawyer fees during credit negotiation is very weak but positive at r= 0.149. 
 
Table 5.1:Correlation Matrix for Determinants of Total Transaction Costs 
  
Trans
port 
costs 
Cost of 
time 
Local 
authorit
y fees 
Lawyer 
fees 
Food& 
refresh
ment 
costs 
busines
s 
viabilit
y 
Contra
cts 
breachi
ng cost 
Case 
filing 
costs 
Third 
party 
costs 
Meeting 
facilitati
on costs
Tips 
and 
other 
charges 
Transport 
costs  
PC 1 .898** .961** .352** .494** .739** .883** .879** .856** .406** .792** 
Sig.   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Cost of time PC .898** 1 .799** .249** .575** .771** .779** .771** .782** .491** .656** 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Local 
authority fees 
PC .961** .799** 1 .337** .467** .603** .894** .882** .872** .259** .795** 
Sig.  .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Lawyer fees  PC .352** .249** .337** 1 .282** .278** .419** .394** .404** .149* .314** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .034 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Food& 
refreshment 
costs  
PC .494** .575** .467** .282** 1 .446** .511** .438** .517** .219** .151* 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .031 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
 71
Table 5.1:Correlation Matrix for Determinants of Total Transaction Costs 
business 
viability  
PC .739** .771** .603** .278** .446** 1 .584** .601** .585** .439** .486** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Contracts 
breaching cost 
PC .883** .779** .894** .419** .511** .584** 1 .886** .879** .292** .766** 
Sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Case filing 
costs  
PC .879** .771** .882** .394** .438** .601** .886** 1 .979** .248** .764** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
 N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
 
Third party 
costs  
 
PC .856** .782** .872** .404** .517** .585** .879** .979** 1 .208** .693** 
 Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .003 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
 
Meeting 
facilitation 
costs 
 
PC 
.406** .491** .259** .149* .219** .439** .292** .248** .208** 1 .330** 
 Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .034 .002 .000 .000 .000 .003  .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Tips&other 
charges 
 
PC .792
** .656** .795** .314** .151* .486** .766** .764** .693** .330** 1 
 Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
**. Correlation is 
significant at the 0.000 
level (2-tailed). 
          
*. Correlation is significant 
at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
PC=Pearson Correlation 
          
 
Further findings shows transport costs and cost of time variables have strong positive 
correlation at r=0.898, these variables highly influence each other. Only cost of time 
was included for further analysis. Cost of time and local authority fees shares a 
strong positive correlation at r=0.799, thus local authority fees was not included in 
the next stage of analysis. Lawyer fees variable and cost of time variable have 
positive but weak relationship at r=0.249, they both qualify for further analysis. 
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Several other variables, include food and refreshment variable, business viability, 
contracts breaching costs, case filing costs, third party costs, tips and other charges 
have strong positive correlation with cost of time variable at r=0.575, r=0.771, 
r=0.779, r=0.771 r=0.782, r=0.656 respectively.  
 
Such variables were highly influencing each other and share similar magnitude, only 
time cost variable was taken to represent other variables and avoid possibilities of 
jeopardizing the results. Meetings facilitation costs and cost of time have positive but 
weak relationship at r=0.491 and were both included in the next stage analysis. Three 
variables (time, meeting facilitation costs, and lawyer fees in credit negotiation) with 
weak correlation were taken for further analysis to determine their causality effect on 
total transaction costs. 
 
Table 5.2: Actual Predictors of Total Transaction Costs 
  TTC Cost of time Lawyer fees Meetings costs 
PC TTC 1.000 .859 .413 .318 
Cost of time .859 1.000 .249 .491 
Lawyer fees  .413 .249 1.000 .149 
Meeting costs .318 .491 .149 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) TTC . .000 .000 .000 
Cost of time .000 . .000 .000 
Lawyer fees  .000 .000 . .017 
Meetings costs .000 .000 .017 . 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
From Table 5.2, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test). The 
findings showed strong positive correlation between time variable and total 
transaction costs (dependent variable) at r= 0.859. Several variables were left out 
from this analysis due to the fact that, they had strong correlation with time cost 
variable and thus using them all togather  could have reduced credibility of results. 
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Time costs variable was used, but if any among those variables was used, could have 
yield almost similar results as time costs variable. While the two other explanatory 
variables, lawyer fees and meetings facilitation costs portrayed weaker but positive 
relationship with the total transaction costs at r=.0.413 and r=0.318. This was further 
seen in causality effect in the analysis.  
Table 5.3:Multiple Regression Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .892a .795 .792 4809360 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total meeting facilitation costs, Total lawyer fees during credit contract negotiation, 
Total cost of time 
 
All three predictors, total meetings facilitation costs, lawyer fees and cost of time,  
were entered in the regression model and they were all accepted by the model and 
used for computation as in Table 5.3.The regression model summary, showed the 
degree of variability of response (dependent variable) that is explained by 
independent variables. Given the sum square of model was divided by sum square of 
total (SSM/SST), as captured from ANOVA table. Results are seen in Table 5.3, 
where R Square is given by 0.795 which means the variability of total transaction 
costs is explained for 79.5 % by cost of time, meetings facilitation costs and lawyer 
fees. 
 
Table 5.4: Analysis of Variance 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1796000 3 598800 258.883 .000a 
Residual 462600 200 2313   
Total 2259000 203    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total meeting facilitation costs, Total lawyer fees during credit contract 
negotiation, Total cost of time 
b. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs   
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F-test was very significant since the P value was less than 0.001 (p<.001). Generally 
the model was very significant. Statistically the model predictive power was 
significant. 
 
Table 5.5: Coefficients of Regression Model for TTC Predictors 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 4806000 1636000  2.938 .004 
Total cost of time 7.362 .315 .876 23.338 .000 
Total lawyer fees  9.232 1.411 .216 6.543 .000 
Meetings facilitation costs -11.150 2.837 -.144 -3.930 .000 
 
From the coefficient Table 5.5, the equation for regression line can be drawn. 
Change in 1 percentage of total cost of time caused positive change of 0.876 
percentage in total transaction costs. While change in 1 percentage of lawyer fees 
resulted into positive change of 0.216 percentage in total transaction costs. And 
change in 1 percentage of meetings facilitation costs caused negative change of 
0.144 percentage in TTC. The contribution and causal effect of time costs variable is 
the highest, compared to all other elements of transaction costs. This is due to the 
fact that, time cost element features in all transaction costs categories. Commercial 
banks spend time in searching for borrowers, searching borrower’s information, 
screening borrowers, negotiating credit contracts and monitoring borrowers.  
 
The relationship of meetings facilitation costs and total transaction costs from 
findings in Table 5.2 was weak but positive at r= 0.318, but the new findings in this 
regression model, meetings facilitation costs inversely relate with TTC, any increase 
in the variable will lead to decrease in TTC and the magnitude of change of TTC is 
lower with a change in 1 percentage of meetings costs variables than when time cost 
 75
variable or lawyer fees variables changes.Therefore the null hypothesis that, ‘Time 
variable has no relationship with total transaction costs, has been rejected, since it 
has a strong positive relationship with total transaction costs (TTC). 
 
5.3 Relationship of Transaction Costs Categories 
Three main categories of transaction costs were critically discussed in current study. 
Information search costs, Contracts negotiation costs and Contracts enforcement 
costs. Levels of these categories of transaction costs is affected by conduciveness 
nature of credit business operating environment. For example, credit business 
environment in Tanzania is not conducive, thus levels of these transaction costs 
categories were expected to be very high. Descriptively these categories appeared in 
Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6:Transaction Costs Categories 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
As seen in Table 5.6, mean of total enforcement is more than twice combination of 
both information search costs and contract negotiation costs, while total negotiation 
costs is the smallest. Banks are risk sensitive, thus they normally spent a lot to 
protect themselves against risks of defaults and other hazards, transport costs, time 
spent, tips and allowances incurred to monitor borrowers. But as well they normally 
incur costs for filling cases, paying lawyers and local government levies and 
sometimes they pay third parties to enforce credit contracts. All this caused total 
enforcement costs to be the highest compared to other categories of transaction costs. 
N  Mean Std. Deviation 
204 Total search costs 3535300 2001980 
204 Total negotiation costs 2894300 931803 
204 Total enforcement costs 14375000 7931510 
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Commercial banks concentrate their efforts on debt collection of few credit 
customers already secured. They do not bother putting more efforts on searching for 
more credit customers and securing of more credit deals. As well less costs is 
incurred on negotiations since they only deal with few known credit customers. Most 
commercial banks provide credit services to few customers in urban areas. They are 
afraid of expanding their market share and scale up their credit operations to most 
parts of the country, especially in rural areas due to high transaction costs that they 
cannot absorb, which is largely caused by their preference of using CGS1 (direct 
channel of supplying credits). Despite that fact, the three categories of transaction 
costs are highly related. 
 
Table 5.7:Correlation of Transaction Costs Categories 
  TSC TNC TEC 
TSC PC 1 .856** .899** 
Sig.   .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 
TNC PC .856** 1 .796** 
Sig.  .000  .000 
N 204 204 204 
TEC PC .899** .796** 1 
Sig.  .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.000 level (2 tailed).   
 
All three variables are strongly positively correlated with each other. The coefficient 
of correlation is r= 0.856 for total search costs and total negotiation costs, r= 0.899 
for total search costs and total enforcement costs and r= 0.796 for total negotiation 
and total enforcement costs. Simple linear regression was then followed to determine 
the causality effect of each individual predictor on total transaction costs. 
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Table 5.8:Coefficients of Predictors of Total Transaction Costs 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coeffic (Beta) t 
Sig. 
  B Std.Error 
1 (Constant) 3272000 508757  6.432 .000 
TSC 4.959 .125 .941 39.579 .000 
2 (Constant) -7011000 1280000  -5.478 .000 
TNC 9.611 .421 .849 22.828 .000 
3 (Constant) 1825000 184993.709  9.865 .000 
TEC 1.320 .011 .993 117.110 .000 
 
All three categories of transaction costs (TSC,TNC and TEC) significantly contribute 
to total transaction costs since their p value<0.05. All three coefficients of transaction 
costs categories are positive, thus they positively relate total transaction costs. Each 
transaction costs category share similar magnitude with total transaction costs, in the 
sense that, when a particular category of transaction increase, total transaction costs 
will also increase , or when decrease total transaction will also decrease. Transaction 
costs categories have direct relationship with total transaction costs. 
 
Change in 1 percentage of TSC resulted to change in 0.941 percentage of total 
transaction costs. While change in 1 percentage of TNC resulted to change in 0.849 
percentage of total transaction costs. And change in 1 percentage of TEC resulted to 
change in 0.993 percentage of total transaction costs. From these findings, all three 
categories of TCs significantly contributed to total transaction costs, but as founded 
in previous analysis TEC was the highest category of transaction costs. The causal 
effect and contribution of TEC on TTC is greater than other categories of transaction 
costs. 
 
Therefore, total transaction cost is directly affected by enforcement costs, 
information search costs or negotiation costs. Commercial banks in Tanzania incur 
very high transaction costs in provision of credit services, yet they reach a very few 
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groups in need. Majority of Tanzanians especially those who live in rural areas 
cannot access credit facility from commercial banks (origin of financial services). 
Therefore, there is a serious need for commercial banks to use alternative modes of 
credit governance structures (CGSs) to assist them absorb high transaction costs and 
thus penetrate rural based credit markets.  
 
Current rural based borrowers due to desperation of financial needs borrow from 
non-reputable financial institutions that are considered as credit sharks at interest 
rates twice or triple that of commercial banks (some charge up to 72% annually) and 
they afford to make repayments on time. Commercial banks market interest rate does 
not exceed 25% annually and thus most preferred than most non-bank and informal 
financial institutions, still commercial banks do not make considerable efforts to 
reach majority of those in need of credits, especially those situated in rural part of the 
country.  
 
Despite the fact, these institutions charges very high interest rates due to high 
transaction costs they incur, they are considered efficient interms of transaction costs 
since they make credit services available to majority of those in need in different 
parts of the country. Most commercial banks are considered inefficient in terms of 
transaction costs due to their in ability to provide credit services. Due to fear of risks, 
commercial banks denied an opportunity for Tanzanians to access credit facilities on 
one part, on the other part, they denied themselves an opportunity to scale up their 
credit operations to most part of the country while knowing the fact that, the major 
source of profit in commercial banks is credit operations. 
5.4 Transaction Costs and Choice of Credit Governance Structures (CGSs) 
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With reference to current study specific objective (c), this sectionanalyzed effects of 
transaction costs on choice of the best credit governance structure model of credit 
supply by commercial banks. Current study hypothesis (c)was also tested in this 
section. Each model of CGS used similar predictors (TSC, TNC and TEC) in 
determining whether selected or not, while assuming other CGSs were not existing.  
 
Table 5.9:Transaction Costs and Choice of Credit Governance Structures 
CGS1 Variables B S.E. Wald Df Sig.  
 TSC 1809400 .000 14.092 1 .000  
 TNC -2228200 .000 7.950 1 .005  
 TEC 21225000 .000 9.261 1 .002  
 Constant -2.903 .943 9.475 1 .002  
CGS2  Variables B S.E. Wald Df Sig.  
  TSC -13474000 .000 .465 1 .495  
TNC 57080000 .000 3.382 1 .066  
TEC -5679000000 .000 .018 1 .894  
Constant -.854 .535 2.546 1 .111  
CGS3 Variables B S.E. Wald Df Sig. 
 TSC -181150 .001 28950 1 .986 
 TNC -225130 .002 10742 1 .992 
 TEC -1841500 .000 24478 1 .988 
 Constant 202.027 12150 27655 1 .987 
CGS4 Variables B S.E. Wald  Df Sig. 
 TSC -30662000 .000 1.069 1  .301 
 TNC -21724000 .000 .398 1  .528 
 TEC -18273000 .000 5.800 1  .016 
 Constant 3.235 .668 23.431 1  .000 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
The current study, matched each credit governance structure against total transaction 
costs (total information search costs, total credit contracts negotiation costs and total 
credit contracts monitoring and enforcement costs), to determine the likelihood of 
such particular CGS to be selected given transaction costs. Choice of urban or rural 
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based credit customers was made, given transaction costs. Binary logistic regression 
was used for both analysis. 
 
From results in Table 5.9, when TSC and TEC were increasing while TNC was 
decreasing, influenced the likelihood of commercial banks supplying credits directly 
to borrowers only without using any other credit governance structure. All 
predictor’s variables (TSC, TNC and TEC) were very significant at 5%. The 
likelihood of commercial banks supplying credits through profits intermediary banks 
without using any other channel of credit distribution, was highly influenced by 
decrease of both TSC and TEC while TNC was increasing. TNC was significant at 
7%, the remaining predictor’s (TSC and TEC) were not statistically significant.  
 
The likelihood of commercial banks supplying credits through profit making 
microfinance institutions (CGS3) without using other channels, was influenced by 
decrease of all predictor’s (TSC, TNC and TEC). Despite the fact that all three 
predictor’s were not statistically significant. Decrease in all three predictor’s (TSC, 
TNC and TEC) influenced the likelihood of commercial banks distributing credits 
through non-profit making intermediaries. TEC was statistically significant at 5%, 
TSC and TNC were not very significant. 
 
From Table 5.9, if choice of direct channel for credit supply was made, despite the 
fact that TSC and TEC were rising, commercial banks were able to absorb all the 
costs. Since all predictor’s were very significantly influencing likelihood of credit 
supply through direct channel. The likelihood of selecting other indirect channels 
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requires TSC and TEC to be decreasing for commercial banks to absorb. Thus 
preference of direct channel for credit distribution is linked to 66.2% of respondents 
who preferred this channel in Table 4.1 but as well as 97.6% of respondents who 
preferred distributing credits to urban based customers. 
 
Credit operating environment in urban areas is conducive, thus minimizes credit 
transaction costs. Therefore direct channel is the best for commercial banks credit 
supply in urban areas since TCs can be well mitigated. Commercial banks credit 
scale up must involve CGSs with intermediaries, given non-conducive credit 
business environment in rural areas. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (c) which 
states, there is relationship between transaction costs and CGSs, is accepted since as 
proven in above analysis, choice of any CGS for credit supply by commercial banks, 
depends on the level and influence of transaction costs. 
 
5.5  TC Determinants of Choice of Urban Credit Customers or Rural 
Based Credit Customers 
From the classification Table 5.10, percentage of respondents from commercial 
banks that selected cluster of rural based customers for credit supply was 3.8% only 
compared to 97.6% of that selected urban based credit customers as best cluster for 
credit supply. This model correctly predicts results by 61.8 %. Commercial banks 
prefer dealing directly with credit customers and thus the rational and optimal option 
for them is dealing with urban based customers. 
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Table 5.10:Choice prediction of Urban vs. Rural Based Credit Customers 
 Predicted 
Observed Rural based credit customers Urban based credit customers Percentage Correct 
Rural based customers 3 75 3.8 
Urban based customers 3 123 97.6 
Overall Percentage   61.8 
    
Source: Researcher (2015) 
This is due to high transaction costs associated with rural based customers given 
current credit business operating environment, where the national identification 
system is not yet in place thus becomes difficult and expensive accessing borrowers 
information, the newly established CRB is not yet effectively working, infrastructure 
and other supportive facilities were not conducive especially in rural areas thus made 
it difficult and costly locating credit customers and even more costly monitoring and 
enforcing credit contracts once credits given. Thus urban based customers seemed to 
be the best option for most commercial banks. 
 
Table 5.11:TCs Determinants of Choice of Urban vs. Rural Based Credit 
Customers 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
TSC 31403100 .000 1.853 1 .173 1.000 
TNC -28725000 .000 .869 1 .351 1.000 
TEC -376930000 .000 .574 1 .449 1.000 
Constant .747 .549 1.852 1 .173 2.110 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
 
Commercial banks likelihood of choosing urban based credit customers over rural 
based credit customers is influenced by an increase in TSC and decrease in both 
TNC and TEC. Implication of these findings, TSC are lower in urban areas since 
borrowers can be easily be located due to good infrastructures. Borrower’s 
information can be easily accessed, thus cut down screening costs. Residents in 
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urban areas are more civilized than rural areas. Thus at all times TSC can be easily 
absorbed by commercial banks in urban areas. TEC is the highest category of TCs, 
but it can easily be reduced through direct channel for credit supply in urban areas to 
gather with TNC. Thus direct channel considered efficient for supplying credits in 
urban areas by commercial banks.The alternative hypothesis (d) of this study which 
states that there is relationship between TCs and choice of urban based credit 
customers, is accepted since TCs influence choice of credit customers as analyzed 
above. 
 
5.6 Multiple Credit Governance Structures with Reference Category 
Multinomial logistic regression, used all four CGSs. In analysis, one credit 
governance structure at each time was assumed as not existing. Thus best CGS given 
transaction costs was determined from three CGSs remained. When assuming 
nonexistence of CGS1, TSC when increasing, TNC and TEC when decreasing 
influence the likelihood of commercial banks supplying credits through profit 
intermediary banks (CGS2). 
 
The likelihood of commercial banks supplying credits through profit intermediary 
microfinance institutions (CGS3) or through non-profit making intermediaries 
(CGS4) is influenced by increase in TSC while TNC and TEC are all decreasing. 
Despite TCs having similar effect on choice of CGSs but their significance level 
differ. TCs were very significant influencing likelihood ofcommercial banks 
supplying credits through profit intermediary banks (CGS2) where TSC and TEC 
were all significant at 5% while TNC at 20% significance level. 
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The likelihood of commercial banks distributing credits directly to borrowers 
(CGS1), or through profit making microfinance institutions (CGS3) or through non-
profit making intermediaries (CGS4) is similarly influenced by the same condition of 
decrease in TSC and increase in both TNC and TEC. This is when commercial banks 
channel for credit distribution through profit intermediary banks (CGS2) assumed as 
non-existing.Significance level of TCs influence on the likelihood of choosing credit 
supply channel differs among CGSs.  
 
TSC and TEC were 5% significant while TNC was 20% significant when credits 
were directly distributed to borrowers. When credits distributed through profit 
making microfinance institutions, TSC was significant at 6%, TNC at 40% and TEC 
at 5%. When credits were distributed through non-profit intermediaries, TSC was 
significant at 30%, TNC at 80% and TEC at 70%. Thus TCs significantly influence 
the likelihood of commercial banks distributing credits directly to borrowers and 
through profit making microfinance institutions than credit distribution through non-
profit making intermediaries 
 
When CGS3 assumed as not existing, and TSC is decreasing while TNC and TEC 
are increasing, influence the likelihood of commercial banks credits supply directly 
to borrowers. When TSC is increasing while both TNC and TEC are decreasing, 
influence the likelihood of Credit supply through profit intermediary banks. 
Likelihood of choosing channel for credit supply through non-profit making 
intermediaries is also influenced by increase in TSC and decrease in both TNC and 
TEC.  
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Table 5.12:Multinomial Regression Results for Choice of CGSs 
 
 
CGS1 
reference 
category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CGS2 
reference 
category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CGS3 
Reference 
Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CGS4 
reference 
category 
 
 
 
            Variables  B Std. Error Df Sig. Exp(B) 
CGS2 
 
 
CGS3 
 
CGS4 
TSC 1373600 .000 1 .026 1.000 
TNC -1001500 .000 1 .191 1.000 
TEC -28226000 .000 1 .016 1.000 
TSC 17663000 .000 1 .539 1.000 
TNC -28755000 .000 1 .411 1.000 
TEC -288830000 .000 1 .638 1.000 
TSC 69673000 .000 1 .261 1.000 
TNC -68023000 .000 1 .269 1.000 
TEC -21231000 .000 1 .122 1.000 
              Variables  B Std. Error Df Sig. Exp(B) 
CGS1 
 
 
CGS3 
 
 
CGS4 
TSC -1373600 .000 1 .026 1.000 
TNC 1001500 .000 1 .191 1.000 
TEC 28226000 .000 1 .016 1.000 
TSC -1196900 .000 1 .056 1.000 
TNC 71391000 .000 1 .360 1.000 
TEC  25338000 .000 1 .036 1.000 
TSC -67684000 .000 1 .298 1.000 
TNC 32123000 .000 1 .705 1.000 
TEC 699480000 .000 1 .628 1.000 
             Variables  B Std. Error Df Sig. Exp(B) 
CGS1 
 
 
CGS2 
 
CGS4 
TSC -17663000 .000 1 .539 1.000 
TNC 28755000 .000 1 .411 1.000 
TEC 288830000 .000 1 .638 1.000 
TSC 1196900 .000 1 .056 1.000 
TNC -71391000 .000 1 .360 1.000 
TEC -25338000 .000 1 .036 1.000 
TSC 52010000 .000 1 .411 1.000 
TNC -39268000 .000 1 .538 1.000 
TEC -18343000 .000 1 .191 1.000 
              Variables  B Std. Error Df Sig. Exp(B) 
CGS1 
 
 
CGS2 
 
CGS3 
TSC 
-70004000 .000 1 .258 1.000 
TNC 68298000 .000 1 .267 1.000 
TEC 21187000 .000 1 .123 1.000 
TSC 67711000 .000 1 .298 1.000 
TNC -32162000 .000 1 .705 1.000 
TEC -699710000 .000 1 .628 1.000 
TSC -51541000 .000 1 .415 1.000 
TNC 38860000 .000 1 .542 1.000 
TEC 18464000 .000 1 .188 1.000 
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Among above three choices of credit supply channels, transaction costs were very 
significantly influencing the likelihood of credit supply through profit intermediary 
banks compared to other channels, where TSC was significant at 6%, TNC at 40% 
and TEC at 5%. When TSC is decreasing while TNC and TEC are increasing, they 
influence the likelihood of commercial banks distributing credits both directly to 
borrowers and through profit making microfinance institutions. While increase in 
TSC and decrease in both TNC and TEC influence the likelihood of credit supply 
through profit intermediary banks. Effects of transaction costs (TSC, TNC and TEC) 
on these choices, had no significant influence on the likelihood of choosing them. 
 
According to these findings, for efficient credit operations of commercial banks and 
scale up of credit operations to both rural and urban areas, multiple credits 
governance structures must be used. Credit supply through profit intermediary banks 
was efficient when direct channel for credit supplywas not used. Direct credit supply 
channel and indirect channel for credit distribution through profit making 
microfinance institutions were efficient when indirect channel for credit supply 
through profit intermediary banks was not used. As well as credit distribution 
through profit intermediary banks was efficient when, credit distribution channel 
through profit making microfinance institutions was not used. 
 
Further findings suggested, whenever choice of direct channel was involved, TSC 
must be decreasing. Non-conducive nature of credit business environment in rural 
areas cannot allow TSC to decrease due to underdevelopment of rural areas in terms 
of remoteness and poor infrastructure development, difficulties in identifying and 
screening borrowers due to difficulties in accessing borrower’s information and 
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cultural barriers (poor tradition and customs). Therefore given current credit business 
environment in Tanzania rural areas, direct channel for credit supply is best for credit 
supply in urban areas. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes all the findings from analysis made in previous chapters 
(chapter 4&5) in relation to key objectives of the study. Applications of transaction 
cost economics theory have been evidenced, recommendations for policy and further 
studies have been given and conclusion was made. 
 
6.2 Summary of Key Research Findings 
One among key objectives of Liberalization of banking industry in 1991 was to 
regulate credit operations so as to ensure easy accessibility of such a facility, by 
majority of Tanzanians, especially those in rural areas at low and affordable costs. 
Current study findings showed that, a few commercial banks that scaled up their 
credit operations to rural areas are no longer interested in providing such a service to 
rural customers and therefore shutting down their credit operations in rural areas. 
They concentrate in urban areas with some few credit customers that they consider 
credit worth.  
 
New and emerging commercial banks are also concentrating on urban borrowers, 
they are not interested to scale up their credit operations to rural areas.The 
fundamental theory that guides the current study, is ‘transaction cost economic 
theory’. According to this theory, when transaction costs is too high, there will not be 
a transaction at all. And therefore parties to such a transaction that didn’t take place 
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are considered inefficient in terms of transaction costs. With that regard, most 
commercial banks that failed to transact credit with rural customers were considered 
inefficient in terms of transaction costs. 
 
Four different types of credit governance structures (credit contractual arrangements) 
that might be used by commercial banks to mitigate transaction costs were revealed 
in the current study. Choice of which governance structure to be used to govern a 
particular credit contract, depends on the level of transaction costs involved. Current 
study further revealed that, given the current credit business environment in 
Tanzania, 66.2% of commercial banks prefer using credit governance structure one 
(CGS1) among the four identified by distributing credits directly to final users rather 
than employing the rest of governance (CGS 2-4), that involves intermediaries. Only 
33.8% of commercial banks prefer using intermediaries in credit supply, this trend 
led to multiplication of credit transaction costs. 
 
Low trust level of banks on borrowers, poor borrower’s reputation, remoteness of 
borrowers, borrowers with no credit collateral or guarantor, borrowers with low 
market value collateral, low expected borrowing frequency (loyalty), small credit 
amount needed by borrowers, causes TCs to rise. In the current study findings, 
whenever such factors are present during credit contractual arrangement, they 
necessitate rise of transaction costs which lead to inefficiency of parties involved. As 
a result, the transaction may not take place at all. Such costs could be reduced by 
commercial banks if they use more intermediaries to supply credit to rural borrowers 
rather than dealing with them directly. 
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Three main categories of transaction costs were analyzed, borrower’s information 
search costs, credit contract negotiation costs and credit contract monitoring and 
enforcement costs. According to the findings, costs of monitoring and enforcing 
credit contacts was higher than other categories of transaction costs. The credit 
operating environment in Tanzania rural areas is not conducive to support direct 
credit supply from commercial banks. The national identification system is not yet in 
place, the credit reference bureau is not effectively functioning since it lacks 
borrower’s information. Therefore the level of credit worthiness, trust, reputation and 
credibility established by banks on borrowers, usually not reliable and lead to 
default. Thus to avoid non repayments, commercial banks invests more on 
monitoring and enforcement of credits 
 
Different methods of analysis used in the current study complement each other on 
assessing effects of transaction costs on choice of an efficient credit governance 
structure. In descriptive analysis, the average total transaction costs for CGS1 was 
lower than the rest of credit governance structures. Transaction costs theory states, 
efficiency will be achieved when a contractual arrangement (governance structure) 
economizes in terms of transaction costs, for that regard CGS1 is efficient than other 
governance structure. When logistic regression method was opted, similar results 
were obtained. Where commercial banks supply credits directly to individual 
borrowers (CGS1), it is the best choice for credits supply by commercial banks to 
urban based borrowers, given transaction costs. 
 
CGS1 will only allow most commercial banks (large, small, domestic and foreign) to 
scale up credit operations to most part of the country and easy accessibility of credit 
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facility to most people in need of credit services, when the credit business operating 
environment in the country is conducive and stable to provide required support. 
Currently, most commercial banks provide credit services to borrowers mostly in 
urban areas where the environment is conducive and stable to support efficiency of 
CGS1. 
 
Therefore CGS1 was highly preferred by most commercial banks and its efficient 
than CGS2-4 as it economizes in terms of transaction costs. These findings are true 
only if commercial banks persists with the current trend of providing credits to urban 
based borrowers and ignore rural based customers. Or when the credit business 
operating environment in Tanzania is conducive and stable in terms of effectiveness 
of national identification system, infrastructure development to allow accessibility to 
most remote areas and rural based borrowers, effective functioning of credit 
reference bureau (CRB), increase in literacy rate of the country so as to have 
knowledgeable borrowers equipped with credit and business management skills since 
it’s not the role of the banks to train borrowers.  
 
 Current study further suggests, CGS1 is not suitable for allowing commercial banks 
to scale up their credit operations to rural and remote areas of Tanzania. Using CGS1 
to scale up credit operations to rural areas by commercial banks multiplied 
borrower’s information search costs, credit contracts negotiation costs and credit 
contracts monitoring and enforcement costs and therefore render’s CGS1 inefficient 
in terms of transaction costs. Commercial banks were not able to absorb such costs, 
thus they opted not to provide the service to rural based customers. 
 92
6.2.1 Current Study Comparison with Previous Studies  
Current study findings reflect developing economies environment.A number of 
factors were used as determinants of transaction costs. Legendary contributors in the 
field of transaction cost economics, Ronald Couse (1937), Oliver Williamson (1971, 
1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001 and 2010), Commons (1932) and Tadelis 
(2010), in their studies of organization of transactions and transaction costs used 
three variables as main causes of transaction costs.  
 
The first one was bounded rationality, this is the information gap between transacting 
parties which may lead to practice of opportunistic behavior, where one party to a 
transaction take advantage of lack of information of the other party and benefit at 
expense of the other, for example one may borrow with a clear intention of not 
making repayment, without the lender knowing. As well bounded rationality causes 
uncertainty of both parties to a transaction, such parties may take measures to protect 
themselves and raise transaction costs.  
 
Other determinants were investment in asset specificity. Parties to a transaction may 
invest into specific assets so as to serve best the other party and maximize benefits of 
transactions. For stance due to underdevelopment of rural environment in Tanzania, 
commercial banks may decide to build infrastructure to reach rural population or 
train staff dedicated in servicing credits to rural based borrowers. The last one was 
transaction frequencies. According to Williamson (2010), transaction frequencies is 
inversely related to transaction costs since it increases negotiation power and lower 
TCs. 
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Current study does not differ with prepositions made by Tadelis and Williamson 
(2010) on their determinants of transaction costs. In addition to bounded rationality, 
frequency of transactions and asset specificity, current study has pointed out several 
other determinants of transaction costs particularly for less developed countries like 
Tanzania. Such determinants includes illiteracy rate, poor infrastructure, unclear 
political will and commitment towards rural development, lack of national 
identification system, culture barrier (poor traditions and customs).  
 
These determinants of TCs are relevant in diverse sectors, and not just commercial 
banks credit supply. They all have direct relationship with total transaction costs.On 
top of that, current study identified other specific determinants in relation to 
commercial banks credit operations in URT, including trust, reputation, distance, 
decision lag, borrowing frequency, credit size (loan amount), and presence of 
collateral or guarantor and market value of collateral. These determinants were used 
to generate specific and measurable elements of TCs that were actually used for 
analysis in current study. 
 
Another study on determinants of transaction costs and credit access by SMEs and 
poor households in Zimbabwe by Masuko and Mafuru (2003) pointed out 
determinants of transaction costs in credit supply chain. Such determinants include, 
borrowing experience which inversely relate to transaction costs, time factor which 
directly relate to transaction costs, loan size which inversely relate to transaction 
costs and distance which is directly related to transaction costs. Their study was not 
specifically on commercial banks rather diverse financial institutions involved in 
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credit distribution. Current study focused on commercial banks credit supply in 
Tanzania. Some of their determinants founded in Zimbabwe resembles those 
founded in current study. 
 
Table 6.1:Summary of key Transaction Costs Determinants Identified in the 
Current Study 
Scholars/Studies TCs Determinants Effect on 
TCs 
Williamson, Course, 
Tadelis, Commons (TCs 
determinants) supported 
and adopted by current 
study 
Transaction frequency - 
Asset specificity + 
Bounded rationality + 
Typical for less developed 
countries like Tanzania, 
identified in current study 
 
 
 
 
Illiteracy rate + 
Poor infrastructure + 
Unclear political will and commitment + 
Lack of national identification system + 
Culture barrier (poor traditions and 
customs) 
+ 
Specific for commercial 
banks credit operations in 
Tanzania as used in current 
study 
Trust High - 
 Low + 
Reputation High - 
 Low + 
Credit amount - 
Borrowing frequency - 
Distance + 
Decision lag + 
Presence of collateral/guarantor - 
Market value of 
collateral 
High - 
 Low + 
Source: Researcher (2015) 
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From the Table 6.1, transaction costs determinants, mostly supported by the current 
study have been shown and their effect towards transaction costs. The preceding 
authors emphasized on transaction frequencies, bounded rationality and asset 
specificity as main transaction costs determinants. Current study does not differ with 
the preceding authors, on top of that several other determinants of transaction costs 
of commercial banks credit operations in Tanzania have been identified. Mostly have 
been used in TCs measurement process in the current study after been further broken 
down, as appeared in chapter five. 
 
Igwe and Egbuson (2013), pointed out several determinants of transaction costs in 
their study of determinants of transaction costs for borrowers among farmers in 
Ikwuano, local government area, in Abia state Nigeria. Basically their study focused 
on demand side of credits. Current study focused on supply side of credits. Their 
study showed that distance to the credit institution, age of the farmer, interest rate, 
loan size and membership of cooperatives were positive and significantly related to 
transaction costs. Assets of the farmer and information services were negative and 
significantly related to transaction costs. Level of education of the farmer, savings 
and gender were positive but not significant to transaction costs. 
 
Hyytinen and Pajarinen(2008), Temu (2009), Olomi (2009), and Beck (2008), all 
agreed that, the main source of high credit transaction costs is asymmetric of 
information between lenders and borrowers. Under asymmetric information 
conditions commercial banks were uncertain about the future behavior of the 
borrowers in terms of repayments. Information asymmetry between borrowers and 
the commercial banks is reflected in inability of the majority of rural based 
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borrowers to provide up to date reliable financial information and realistic business 
plans, which increases credit transaction costs. Consequently limits the ability of 
banks to assess the credit-worthiness of the individual borrowers. Transaction cost 
economic theory argues that banks are not interested in offering credit to MSMEs, 
farmers and poor households because information asymmetries resulting to high 
screening costs, credit contracts negotiation costs, monitoring, and enforcement 
costs. 
 
Current study agrees with arguments given by preceding authors that high 
transaction costs associated with credit provision to rural areas due to information 
asymmetries, is the reason why commercial banks do not want provide credit 
services to rural areas of Tanzania. Current study further added, not only information 
asymmetric caused high transaction costs but as well as non-conducive nature of 
rural environment of Tanzania which is characterized by poor infrastructure 
(remoteness), Unclear political will and commitment towards rural development, 
high illiteracy rate, poor traditions and customs (cultural barriers). Current study 
went further and provide possible solution to high transaction costs associated with 
commercial banks credit provision to rural areas of Tanzania. Preceding authors tried 
to point out the problem, but current study confirmed the problem and recommended 
solution.  
 
Current study recommends commercial banks to use credit governance structures 
with intermediaries when providing credits to rural based borrowers, for example, 
community development banks, village community banks (VICOBAs), farmers 
associations, trader associations, village savings and loan associations 
 97
(VSLAs),Savings and Credit Associations (SACAs), Rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs), Non-government organizations and Non-profit making 
organizations. Most of these intermediaries are located in rural areas, they highly 
equipped with information of rural based borrowers and therefore asymmetric of 
information will be solved and transaction costs levels lowered. Such intermediaries 
will absorb transaction costs instead of commercial banks. Thus commercial banks 
will easily control, monitor and enforce credit contracts on intermediaries but not 
individual borrowers. Therefore scale up of commercial banks credit operations to 
rural areas will be possible. Currently two commercial banks are actively using 
intermediaries in their credit business and they have succeeded to scale up and 
maximize their profitability. 
 
6.2.2Application of Transaction Cost Economics Theory in Credit Supply 
Market in Tanzania 
Current study has discovered possible three different scenarios of applicability of 
transaction costs theory that were not pointed out by other scholars. The first 
scenario is when transacting parties used a mode of governance structure that 
economizes in terms of transaction costs and therefore efficiency is attained. This 
scenario normally assumes that, where there is economization of transaction costs, 
there is massive flow of transactions, then there is efficiency, the same way it applies 
to neo-classical economic theories, like in theory of cost of production or theory of 
the firm.  
 
This scenario of transaction costs theory does not applies to less developed 
economies like Tanzania where the credit business operating environment is not 
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conducive and supportive to allow smooth flow of credit business from commercial 
to both urban based borrowers and rural based borrower.The second scenario is 
when, the contractual arrangements made by transacting parties led to economization 
in terms of transaction costs, despite that fact, efficiency is not attained. This 
scenario of transaction costs theory applies to commercial banks credit supply in 
Tanzania. Most commercial banks in Tanzania economizes in terms of transaction 
costs when supplying credits to customers, in particular, urban based customers 
using credit governance structure one (CGS1), these banks are not efficient despite 
economization due to the fact that they failed to scale up their credit operations to 
rural areas where majority of those in need of credit services reside. Thus most 
customers in rural areas are left out of commercial banks credit facility due to 
inability of commercial banks to scale up their credit operations. 
 
The third scenario of applicability of transaction cost economics theory is when, the 
contractual arrangements (mode of governance structure) opted by transacting parties 
does not economize in terms of transaction costs yet efficiency is attained. This 
scenario applies to commercial banks credit operations in Tanzania. Current study 
findings revealed that, some few big domestic commercial banks have dominated 
credit supply market in Tanzania. Since they provide credit services to both urban 
and rural based customers regardless of high transaction costs associated with rural 
based customers due to non-conducive nature of credit business operating 
environment in rural areas.  
 
Such banks used both direct channel for credit supply and other indirect channels 
that involves intermediaries to supply credits to both rural based customers and urban 
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based customers. These banks incur high transaction costs compared to those operate 
in urban areas only, thus they are not economizing in terms of transaction costs but 
still they are efficient due to the fact that, they have ability to absorb the costs 
incurred and scale up their credit operations by making credit services available to 
both urban based and rural based customers at mutual gain. 
 
As a result of preference of CGS1 by 66.2% of commercial banks, the market share 
of commercial banks credit operations is limited and they scramble for the same few 
urban based customers who often turn up to be fraud and defaulters. Current study 
revealed, economizing of transaction costs may not be enough to conclude that a 
credit governance structure is efficient but also ability of a credit governance 
structure to assist commercial banks to scale up their credit operations throughout the 
country regardless of transaction cost levels, as long as they can be absorbed by 
commercial banks. Therefore enable more of those in need of credit services to 
access credit facilities. 
 
Three largest domestic commercial banks among 34 registered and licensed 
commercial banks in the country, current study revealed that, they have monopolized 
the credit supply market in the country. These banks are not just using direct channel 
for supplying credits but multiple channels of supplying credits (CGS1-CGS4). The 
costs of credits is high because of distance, remoteness of rural areas, usage of 
intermediaries and high risk of default due to uncertainty nature of income 
generating activities of those who lives in rural areas, still these three banks are 
considered efficient. Despite of all difficulties, they managed to absorb the 
transaction costs involved, expand their credit operations and grant opportunity to 
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many in need of credit facility to have access of such service. Despite high interests 
charged, people afford to borrow and make repayments. 
 
According to neo-classical economic theories, there is no efficiency without 
optimality. Input and output relationship, or input costs and output costs relationship 
has to be measured to determine efficiency. Under transaction costs theory, 
optimality does not dictate efficiency. As witnessed from the current study, most 
commercial banks supply credits through CGS1 to urban based customers with an 
intention of economizing in terms of transaction costs. Yet they are not efficient due 
to the fact that credit business operating environment in Tanzania is not conducive to 
allow scale up of credit operations to rural based markets by commercial banks when 
they use CGS1. Under transaction costs theory, what matter is the ability of 
transacting parties to absorb the cost caused by the mode of governance structure 
(contractual arrangement used) mutually agreed to be used to govern their 
transaction at mutual gain. This allows transactions to take place despite the costs, 
renders services available and realization of efficiency in transaction costs terms. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Liberalization of banking industry in Tanzania from 1990’s aimed at promoting 
development of market based financial sector as a strategy to turn around the 
deteriorating economy and accelerate economic growth. Ultimately to bring 
soundness, efficiency and integrity of financial and banking system, also to easy 
accessibility of financial services to micro, small and medium enterprises, farmers 
and majority of Tanzanians, especially those dwell in rural areas.Despite such 
considerable efforts by the government of Tanzania that led to greater increase in 
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number of domestic, foreign and private commercial banks and nonbanks financial 
institutions, accessibility of financial services, especially credit facility is still a 
challenge. BOT reports (2014) revealed that less than 15% of Tanzanians have 
access to formal financial services. Further statistics from same reports showed, 
formal private sector credit to GDP in Tanzania is 18% while the average of sub-
Saharan Africa is 60%. 
 
This is clear indication of extent of formal credit starvation faced by Tanzanians. 
MSMEs survey (2014) indicated that 90% of MSMEs did not have access to 
financial services from formal financial institutions. About 22% of these were served 
by informal associations. 69% were financially excluded in the sense of credits. 
Finscope survey (2013) also pointed out that, only 6.8% of all Tanzanians who live 
in rural areas have access to financial services from commercial banks. Rural 
population is 70.4% of total population in the country. 
 
Given above facts, current study revealed that, formal financial institutions, 
particularly commercial banks are very sensitive to risks and high costs. Majority of 
Tanzanians especially those in serious need of credits live in rural part of the 
country. Such areas are very underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure and thus 
difficult to be reached and costly to locate credit customers. Lack of effective 
National identification system and poor planning of towns and cities also make it 
difficult to locate and identify credit customers and even too costly to acquire their 
information and hence impose huge risks to commercial banks giving credits to most 
people in need. 
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On top of that, majority of Tanzanians lack business and financial management 
knowledge, skills and commitment as a result they usually divert the use of credits 
given, leading to high risks of defaults and non-repayments of credits. Normally 
commercial banks tend to avoid giving credits in such circumstances due to the fact 
that they are not ready to incur high costs to provide financial and business 
management trainings to credit customers. Above facts made costs of transacting 
credits too high and renders commercial banks inefficient in terms of credit 
transaction costs since they cannot absorb such costs, thus they chose not to provide 
credit services at all, especially to rural based customers. 
 
Most commercial banks prefer direct channel of distributing credits to borrowers 
(CGS1). They find it suitable dealing directly with individual persons rather than 
using intermediaries. Most commercial banks do not understanding the cost 
implication of using different credit governance structures. Credit governance 
structure one(CGS1) or direct channel of supplying credits carries low transaction 
costs compared to indirect channels. CGS1 is the most economizing mode of credit 
governance structure. Despite that fact, usage of direct channel has negative effects 
to both commercial banks and borrowers. 
 
When providing credits to borrowers in rural areas, often transaction costs tend to 
rise, commercial banks usually required to absorb all the costs themselves if using 
CGS1. Because they are risks and cost sensitive, mostly decided better off not to 
provide credit services at all despite the need and focus only in urban areas where the 
costs of credit transaction is low. This fact led to credit starvation to most people in 
need of credit services in Tanzania due to limited supply of credit facility from 
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commercial banks. Despite that, most commercial banks in Tanzania are 
economizing transaction costs through using CGS1, they are considered inefficient 
due to immense formal credit starvation faced by majority of Tanzanians in need of 
credit facility, especially those in rural areas due to limited supply of credit services 
from commercial banks. 
 
As a result of critical need of fund for business and farming, people borrow from 
informal financial institutions because services are either not available or available at 
difficulty conditions from commercial banks that most borrowers cannot afford. 
Despite the fact that, some of these financial institutions are considered credit sharks 
due to their tendency of reaping money from borrowers by charging very high 
interest rates, some up to 6% per month (72% annually), still people borrow from 
them and make repayments. 
 
It has been evidenced from the study findings that, it is not satisfactory to simply 
consider a commercial bank as efficient in terms of credit transaction costs when 
using a mode of credit governance structure that is economizing transaction costs. 
The selected mode of credit governance structure not only has to economize 
transaction costs but also has to grant an opportunity for commercial banks to scale 
up their credit operations to both rural and urban areas. According to transaction cost 
economics theory a CGS is considered efficient as long as it economize transaction 
costs, with an assumption that, where there is transaction costs economization, there 
is also massive flow of transactions. Above facts do not apply to commercial banks 
credit operations in Tanzania because flow of credit transactions from commercial is 
limited especially in rural areas despite usage of CGS1.  
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From the findings commercial banks in Tanzania are economizing transaction costs 
by using CGS1. Despite that fact, they are not considered efficient due to failure 
scaling up their credit operations to rural areas because of fear of high TCs. With 
exception of three (3) big domestic commercial banks, the remaining commercial 
banks credit operations is limited only to urban areas as a result of using CGS1.The 
Tanzanian credit business operating environment is still far behind to allow efficient 
functioning of CGS1 (direct supply of credits from commercial banks to borrowers). 
Most part of Tanzania rural areas is still remote and difficult to be accessed. The 
national identification system is not yet in place, thus identification and searching of 
borrower’s information is still a problem. 
 
The newly established credit reference bureau (CRB) is not yet effectively 
functioning since so much information of borrowers is still missing, poor 
infrastructure in most part of rural areas of the country pose a greater challenge to 
reach majority of those living in those areas. Despite above challenges that may lead 
to high transaction costs when providing credit services to people living in rural 
Tanzania, yet three big domestic commercial banks are providing credit services to 
most part of the country, including many borrowers who live in rural areas.  
 
The reason behind their success and domination of credit supply market is usage of 
multiple credit governance structures (CGS1-CGS4). They supply credits directly to 
borrowers but also they use intermediaries where necessary. Commercial banks 
transfer transaction costs and risks to intermediaries where seemingly high and 
difficult to be absorbed and thus assure availability of credit services.With reference 
to new institution economics as pioneered by Williamson (1971), the transaction 
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costeconomics theory states that, when one or more parties to a transaction incur 
high transaction costs which cannot be absorbed, such parties are considered to be 
inefficient in terms of transaction costs (TC). Current study reveals that, credit 
transaction costs for commercial banks in Tanzania is very high and thus renders 
them inefficient if not absorbed.  Most commercial banks tend to avoid offering 
credits facility to majority of Tanzanians especially those live in rural areas since 
they cannot absorb high transaction costs involved. As a result they scramble for the 
same, few, known credit customers in urban areas to avoid high transaction costs and 
risks of default and losses. 
 
Despite high transaction costs in the provision of credit services by commercial 
banks in Tanzania, some few banks(mainly three banks) have dominated credit 
supply market(both rural and urban market). More than 50% market share for credit 
supply is controlled by three big banks in the country. Regardless of the fact that, 
they incur high transaction costs, they are capable of absorbing such high costs and 
renders credit services available to customers at interest rate affordable than most 
non-banks and informal financial institutions. Such commercial banks are considered 
efficient, and use CGSs with intermediaries to penetrate rural based market. 
 
6.4 Recommendations 
6.4.1 Policy Recommendations 
The government of URT, should put more emphasis on infrastructure development 
and makes most part of the country accessible. This will easy the process of locating 
credit customers and commercial banks will expand their market share for credit 
supply at reduced transaction costs. The government should give priority on proper 
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planning of urban and rural areas, town and cities but as well as to speed up 
development of national identification system. Such developments will assists both 
banks and non-banks financial institutions to easily and quickly search and screen 
potential credit customers and maintain data base of borrowers at low costs.  
 
The current established credit reference bureau is neither efficient nor effective since 
it lacks so much borrower’s information, it has information of some few known 
borrowers, especially those located in urban areas. Installation of the national 
identification system is so vital for commercial banks credit operations since it 
involves maintenance of the national data base that is linked with commercial banks, 
health insurance funds, pension funds, revenue authority and the like. Such 
developments will easy accessibility of borrowers information and extremely cut 
down the costs. 
 
Commercial banks should consider to transact credits through both direct and 
indirect channels rather than dealing only directly with individual borrowers given 
current credit operational environment in Tanzania. Commercial banks should 
consider transacting more with groups of individuals (group loans), SACCOS, 
traders associations, farmers associations, entrepreneurs associations, women 
associations, community development banks and the like which will later on transact 
credits with individuals in their localities. The government of Tanzania should 
emphasize on establishment and incubation of these associations since they can 
easily be reached by commercial banks and positively change lives of many 
Tanzanians. 
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It is cheaper to identify and locate credit customers of this nature (as above), acquire 
their detailed information but as well majority of those in need of credits will be 
reached at reduced transaction costs. Credit customers of this nature involves 
minimum risks of defaults and non-repayments, and even minimum costs to enforce 
credits contracts in case of default is involved. Once the national identification 
system has been installed and works effectively, the credit reference bureau (CRB) 
will also be linked to its data base, such a move will lead to efficient functioning of 
CRB and when most part of the country (especially rural areas) can be easily 
accessed, it will then be rational for commercial banks to transact credits directly 
with individuals since minimum transaction costs and massive flow of credit 
transactions will be involved. 
 
The microfinance policy was established with an intention of achieving, wide spread 
access to micro finance throughout the country and making sure a wide range of 
institutions were involved in provision of such services, including specialized and 
non-specialized banks, non-banks financial institutions, rural community banks, 
cooperative banks, SACCOS and NGOs. Therefore microfinance was integrated with 
mainstream financial system. To some extent the government of Tanzania has 
succeeded on spreading microfinance services in the country, unfortunately the move 
brought severe consequences to borrowers.  
 
Most of these microfinance institutions do not have funds of their own, thus they 
borrow from commercial banks. Most commercial banks in Tanzania are inefficient 
in their credit operations, especially when dealing with rural based customers, they 
operate at very high transaction costs, such costs are transferred to microfinance 
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institutions as intermediaries that ultimately transferthe costs as interest expense to 
the final borrowers that suffer severely.  
 
The microfinance policy has to be improved further, the vital element of transaction 
costs has to be captured since microfinance activities have been integrated to 
mainstream financial system. The multiplying effect of transaction costs has to be 
minimized by the government. Final users of credits, mostly are low income earners, 
small farmers, micro and small businesses, mostly cannot afford to absorb high 
transaction costs and thus adversely affect their income generating activities. 
Therefore government intervention is crucial to subsidize on transaction costs 
particularly on microfinance institutions that supply credits customers based on rural 
areas. 
 
The government of Tanzania should make tangible socio-economic development in 
rural areas. More resources should be committed towards education improvements 
(i.e. construction of schools, subsidizing school fees), infrastructure development to 
make most areas accessible, provision of diverse and reliable social services such as 
water, electricity, health services and provision of entrepreneurial skills to rural 
population (70.4% of all Tanzanians live in rural areas). Such developments will 
greatly reduce the level of poverty in rural areas and cut down transaction costs.  
 
Business environment will improve and made conducive to attract private firms 
investment inclusive commercial banks and ultimately financial services (including 
credit facility) will be highly available to majority of those in need. Most commercial 
banks in Tanzania are privately owned. Private sectors are too sensitive to invest in 
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areas with high levels of TCs, thus government interventions are needed through 
tangible investment in rural areas that eventually lower cost of making transactions 
and attract entry of private commercial in rural credit supply markets. 
 
According to transaction costs economics theory, where there is high socio-economic 
and technological under development, there is also very high transaction costs. This 
is what is happening in Tanzania rural areas. Due to that fact and despite 
liberalization of banking industry in Tanzania, most commercial banks are not 
willing to invest in rural areas because of high levels of transaction costs associated 
with credit business. Regardless of the market interest rates for credits, commercial 
banks should be allowed to charge different interest rates in different areas of the 
country, depending on the level of development in those areas. This will enable 
commercial banks to compensate high transaction costs in most underdeveloped 
regions of the country. Thus allows commercial banks scale up despite high 
transaction costs and easy accessibility of credit facility from commercial banks 
throughout the country. 
 
6.4.2Recommendation for Further Research 
The work of price mechanism is costly. How to identify the cost elements when 
transacting (exchange) in an open market system and how to measure and quantify 
such costs remain a challenging puzzle for economists. For market transaction 
(exchange) to occur, one needs to identify who is it he/she wishes to deal with and 
inform others, conduct negotiation of terms that lead to bargain and draw up of 
contract, not only that but also to undertake inspections that needed to make sure 
terms of the contract are observed. 
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In every part of transacting activities, transaction cost is involved, however it has 
been and still is a much slower process to work out and have common fundamental 
insight on how to identify, measure and quantify elements of transaction costs. Some 
scholars like Williamson (1971, 1983,1985, 1996, 2001 and 2010) used direct 
measurements of transaction costs, simply as economic value of resources used in 
locating trading partners and executing transactions. Under this type of measurement 
certain proxies such as uncertainty, transaction frequency, asset specificity, 
opportunitism, trust level, reputation and geographical distance of transacting parties 
are normally used to ascertain and estimate transaction costs. This approach of 
measuring transaction costs was used in the current study. 
 
Other scholars quantified transaction costs by measuring the transaction sector of the 
economy. The whole economy is divided into two parts (i) Transformational or 
production sector (ii) Transaction sector. Thus by measuring total value of resources 
used in transaction sector, the aggregate size of transaction costs in the economy is 
ascertained. Despite the fact that this concept proved positive relationship between 
the two sectors of the economy, but the first attempt to quantify the concept was 
elusive and seemingly un-quantifiable. 
 
Non-marketed transaction costs. Scholars like De soto (2000) believed transaction 
sector, captures only part of transaction costs that flows through the market. Non-
marketed transaction costs includes but not limited to costs of resources spent in 
waiting, getting permits to do business, cutting through the red tapes and bribing 
officials. Current study also made use of this approach in quantification of 
transaction costs. These non-marketed transaction costs are wide spread in 
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developing and transition economies as such of Tanzania, though the size of official 
transaction sector is small. 
 
Garbre-Madhin (2001) in her study of Ethiopia grain market, measured transaction 
costs as the costs of setting up a business, i, e, the cost of entry. This differ from 
barrier to entry that is traditionally emphasized in economics literature, instead the 
emphasis is on government imposed cumbersome rules and regulations such as 
registration and licensing requirements, rules on sale or lease of  real estate, import 
and export regulations and taxes. These barriers force entrepreneurs to conduct some 
or all of their business outside the official economy or even worse, discourage them 
from entry all to gather.  
 
Financial economists used money to recognize the costs of exchange since the rise of 
money facilitates the exchange of one commodity for another. Despite that fact, in 
financial economics, transaction costs are generally understood as the costs of 
investing in financial markets, that includes brokerage fees and ask-bid spreads as 
examples. As clearly described above, there are vast ways of measuring and 
quantifying transaction costs, however, validity of most of these approaches is still in 
question. There is no commonly or generally accepted approach of measuring and 
quantifying the cost of exchange. Clearly there is a room for further research on 
which approach should be used to measure and quantify transaction costs. An 
approach that will be generally accepted by scholars of New Institutional Economics 
as their benchmark approach and best practice in quantification and measurement of 
transaction costs (TC). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix  1:Linear Regression Results 
 
1.1 Total information search costs (TSC) and total transaction costs (TTC) 
Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .941a .886 .885 3.57401E6 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total search costs 
ANOVAb 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.001E16 1 2.001E16 1.566E3 .000a 
Residual 2.580E15 202 1.277E13   
Total 2.259E16 203    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total search costs    
b. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs   
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.272E6 508757.893  6.432 .000 
Total search costs 4.959 .125 .941 39.579 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs    
 
1.2 Total negotiation costs (TNC) and total transaction costs (TTC) 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .849a .721 .719 5.58924E6 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total negotiation costs 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.628E16 1 1.628E16 521.115 .000a 
Residual 6.310E15 202 3.124E13   
Total 2.259E16 203    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total negotiation costs   
b. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs   
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -7.011E6 1.280E6  -5.478 .000 
Total 
negotiation 
costs 
9.611 .421 .849 22.828 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs    
 
1.3 Total enforcement costs (TEC) and Total transaction costs (TTC) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjust
ed R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .993a .985 .985 1.27405E6 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total enforcement costs 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.226E16 1 2.226E16 1.371E4 .000a 
Residual 3.279E14 202 1.623E12   
Total 2.259E16 203    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total enforcement costs   
b. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs   
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.825E6 184993.709  9.865 .000 
Total enforcement 
costs 
1.320 .011 .993 117.110 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Total transaction costs    
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Appendix  2: Binomial Logistic Regression Results 
2.1: Credit governance structure one (CGS1) 
Logistic Regression Model Summary for CGS1 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 70.101a .647 .863 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
Prediction selection of CGS1 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
CGS1 DICHOTOMOUS 
Percentage 
Correct 
NOT 
SELECTED SELECTED 
Step 1 CGS1 DICHOTOMOUS NOT SELECTED 95 4 96.0 
SELECTED 6 99 94.3 
Overall Percentage   95.1 
a. The cut value is .500     
Coefficients of predictors of CGS1 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
TSC 1809400 .000 14.092 1 .000 1.000 
TNC -2228200 .000 7.950 1 .005 1.000 
TEC 21225000 .000 9.261 1 .002 1.000 
Constant -2.903 .943 9.475 1 .002 .055 
   
 
2.1 : Credit governance structure two (CGS2) 
 Logistic Regression Model Summary for CGS2  
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 275.318a .023 .030 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
Prediction selection of CGS2 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 CGS2 DICHOTOMOUS 
Percentage 
Correct  NOT SELECTED SELECTED 
Step 1 CGS2 DICHOTOMOUS NOT SELECTED 24 66 26.7 
SELECTED 13 101 88.6 
Overall Percentage   61.3 
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 Logistic Regression Model Summary for CGS2  
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 275.318a .023 .030 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
    
 Coefficients of predictors for CGS2 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a TSC -13474000 .000 .465 1 .495 1.000 
TNC 57080000 .000 3.382 1 .066 1.000 
TEC -5679000000 .000 .018 1 .894 1.000 
Constant -.854 .535 2.546 1 .111 .426 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: TSC, TNC, TEC.    
 
2.3: Credit Governance structure three (CGS3) 
 Logistic Regression Model Summary for CGS3  
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 266.801a .063 .084 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Prediction selection of CGS3 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
CGS3 DICHOTOMOUS 
Percentage 
Correct NOT SELECTED SELECTED 
Step 1 CGS3 DICHOTOMOUS NOT SELECTED 57 33 63.3 
SELECTED 44 70 61.4 
Overall Percentage   62.3 
a. The cut value is .500     
 
Coefficients of predictors for CGS3 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. 
TSC -181150 .001 28950 1 .986 
TNC -225130 .002 10742 1 .992 
TEC -1841500 .000 24478 1 .988 
Constant 202.027 12150 27655 1 .987 
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2.4: Credit governance structure four (CGS4) 
Logistic Regression Model Summary for CGS4  
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 148.976a .454 .616 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Prediction selection for CGS4 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
CGS4 DIECHOTOMUS 
Percentage Correct 
NOT 
SELECTED SELECTED 
CGS4 DIECHOTOMUS NOT SELECTED 99 26 79.2 
SELECTED 6 73 92.4 
Overall Percentage   84.3 
    
 
Coefficients of predictors for CGS4 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
TSC -30662000 .000 1.069 1 .301 1.000 
TNC -21724000 .000 .398 1 .528 1.000 
TEC -18273000 .000 5.800 1 .016 1.000 
Constant 3.235 .668 23.431 1 .000 25.414 
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Appendix  3:Questionnairefor PhD Thesis 
 
STUDENT NAME: HERIEL EMANUEL NGUVAVA 
REG NO: HD/B/287/T012 
 
To be filled by credit officers or anyone responsible with administration and/or 
control of credit distribution to borrowers. 
This questionnaire aims at capturing information related to commercial banks credit 
operations in Tanzania. Specifically to understand systems (channels) of supplying 
credits with an intention of designing and recommending ways of supplying credits 
that are more efficient as far as credit transaction costs is concerned under different 
circumstances (transaction cost determinants). Ultimately to design the best model 
for credits supply that will assist commercial banks to lower their credit transactions 
costs and scale up their credit operations to both rural and urban based customers. 
 
MOBILE NO: 0752/0717 34 88 20 
EMAIL- hnguvava@yahoo.com 
 
All information captured in this questionnaire will be treated with high 
confidentiality and used for academic purposes only. 
 
CREDIT DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS (CREDIT GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES) 
SECTION A. 
I).The following are four (4) commonly used channels of distributing credits to 
borrowers by commercial banks in Tanzania. Please tick where appropriate 
reflecting frequency of using such a particular channel by your bank and mention a 
customer category normally receiving credits through such a channel. 
 
1.Highly used     2.Rarely used      3.Don’t know      4. Not used at all 
Credits distribution channels Use Mention Customer 
category receiving 
credits, eg, 
cooperative 
unions, farmers 
unions, SMEs, etc 
1 2 3 4 
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Credits directly to individual borrowers (Direct 
channel) 
     
Credits to profit making  intermediary banks(I,e 
community development banks)  
     
Credits to profit making  intermediary microfinance 
institutions(I,e SACCOS) 
     
Credits to non-profit making intermediary(I,e 
Government institutions, Religious institutions) 
     
 
 
II) Given the credit distribution channels below, Please fill the table that follows. 
(1) Commercial banks give credits directly to individual borrowers (Direct 
channel) 
(2) Commercial banks give credits to profit making  intermediary banks(I,e 
community development banks) which ultimately deal with individual 
borrowers 
(3) Commercial banks give credits to profit making  intermediary microfinance 
institutions(I,e SACCOS) which ultimately deal with individual borrowers 
(4) Commercial banks give credits to non-profit making intermediary(I,e 
Government institutions) that ultimately deal with individual borrowers 
 
In the table below, fill the number (eg, 1,2,3 or 4) of the credit distribution 
channel that most preferred  by your bank to service the credit customer 
categories outlined in the table. If any, give reasons for your credit channel 
selection 
Credit customers category Credit channel Reasons (If any) 
Registered SMEs   
Community development banks   
Public institutions, eg, Universities, colleges 
and schools 
  
Non-banks microfinance institutions, eg, 
SACCOS 
  
Individual persons   
Other commercial banks   
Unregistered/Informal Micro businesses   
NGOs, eg, FINCA, PRIDE etc.   
Religious organizations, eg, churches     
Large scale farmers   
Small scale farmers   
 
 
III)Below are credits distribution channels commonly used by commercial banks in 
Tanzania. 
(1) Commercial banks give credits directly to individual borrowers (Direct 
channel) 
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(2) Commercial banks give credits to profit making  intermediary banks(I,e 
community development banks) which ultimately deal with individual 
borrowers 
(3) Commercial banks give credits to profit making  intermediary microfinance 
institutions(I,e SACCOS) which ultimately deal with individual borrowers 
(4) Commercial banks give credits to non-profit making intermediary(I,e 
Government institutions and religious institutions) that ultimately deal with 
individual borrowers 
 
When the following circumstances prevail while your bank wants to offer credits to 
customers (borrowers), which channel will you choose (write number of channel 
selected against circumstances given in table below). 
Circumstances Channel selected given 
circumstances prevailed.  
Long geographical distance between our bank 
and potential borrower 
 
Low expected borrowing frequency (borrowers 
loyalty not assured 
 
Low borrowers reputation (status)  
Small credit amount needed by borrower  
Borrower’s collateral have low market value  
The borrower is not much trusted by the bank  
 
IV).Which among these criteria when available, you consider your bank’s credit 
operations efficient? Tick where appropriate 
 
1. Most important    2. Important     3. Not sure    4. Less important      5. Least 
important 
Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 
High repayment rates      
High returns from credits operations      
Minimum credit operational costs      
Minimum credit transaction costs incurred      
Wider geographical coverage in credit distribution      
Large bank’s credit portfolio      
Diversification of credit customers      
Large amount of credit outstanding      
Large number of bank’s borrowers      
 
 
V)Indicate to what extent the following factors lead to increase in cost of carrying 
out credit transactions by commercial banks. Indicate your perception level by 
ticking the appropriate scale level in the space provided.  
1. Highly leading factor        2.Leading factor        3.I do not know       4.Not leading 
factor    5.Not at all leading factor 
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Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
Low trust level of bank on borrower      
Poor borrowers reputation      
Remoteness of borrower      
Borrowers without credit collateral or guarantor      
Borrowers with low market value collateral      
Low expected borrowing frequency      
Small credit amount      
 
 
 
BORROWER’S INFORMATION SEARCH COSTS 
SECTION B 
Please estimate the following costs (per borrower) in relation to the process of 
searching and screening borrowers by your bank when using the four commonly 
used credit distribution channels 
Credit Distribution Channel 
(1) Commercial banks give credits directly to individual borrowers (Direct 
channel) 
(2) Commercial banks give credits to profit making  intermediary banks(I,e 
community development banks) which ultimately deal with individual 
borrowers 
(3) Commercial banks give credits to profit making  intermediary microfinance 
institutions(I,e SACCOS) which ultimately deal with individual borrowers 
(4) Commercial banks give credits to non-profit making intermediary(I,e 
Government institutions and religious institutions) that ultimately deal with 
individual borrowers 
 
 
Cost item Using 
Credit 
channel 
1 
Using 
Credit 
channel 
2 
Using 
Credit 
channel 
3 
Using 
Credit 
channel 
4 
Transport cost to and from the borrower 
in TSH. 
    
Average time spent in searching and 
screening any particular borrower(in 
days or hours) 
    
Borrower’s local area authority/village 
fees paid to receive borrower’s 
information, in TSH. 
    
Average number of 
meetings/consultations with any 
particular borrower until credit delivery 
    
Average cost of facilitating any meeting 
with any particular borrower until credit 
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delivery in TSH 
Average cost paid for  Tips and other 
charges other than those above when 
searching any particular borrowers 
information, in TSH 
    
When Agents find borrowers for your 
bank.  How much in TSH do you pay 
the agent for any particular borrower 
brought in. 
    
 
 
CREDIT CONTRACT NEGOTIATION COSTS 
SECTION C 
Please fill the following table in relation to elements of credit contract negotiation 
costs (per borrower) against commonly used credit distribution channels by 
Commercial banks in Tanzania. Refer to four (4) credit distribution channels in 
section B above. 
 
Cost items Using 
Credit 
Channel 
1 
Using 
Credit 
Channel 
2 
Using 
Credit 
Channel 
3 
Using 
Credit 
Channel 
4 
State average number of hours/days  
spent until credit agreement is reached 
with borrower 
    
State the usually number of 
negotiation meetings with borrower 
until credit agreement is reached 
 
 
 
   
Estimate average cost incurred(e.g 
refreshments, Stationery, allowances 
e.t.c) in TSH by your bank per credit 
contract negotiation meeting with any 
particular borrower 
    
State the usually amount incurred by 
your bank in TSH, as Tips, Fees, 
Rents to facilitate any credit 
negotiation meeting with borrower 
   
 
 
When an agent is used to negotiate 
credit contract with borrowers, state 
the usual amount in TSH normally 
paid by your bank to an Agent for any 
particular contract. 
    
State in TSH legal charges (eg, lawyer 
charges, stamps etc) normally incurred 
by your bank for any particular credit 
contract negotiated  
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CREDIT CONTRACT MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS 
SECTION D 
 
Please indicate costs incurred by your bank (per borrower) as a result of monitoring 
and enforcing credit contracts by using commonly used credit distribution channels 
by Commercial banks in Tanzania. Refer to credit distribution channels (1-4) in 
section B above 
 
Cost items Using 
Credit 
Chan
nel 1 
Usin
g 
Cred
it 
Chan
nel2 
Using 
Credit 
Chann
el 3 
Using 
Credit 
Channel 
4 
State average number of trips to and from any 
particular borrower during follow up and 
monitoring of credits   
    
State in TSH, the average transport cost for 
each trip to and from the borrower during 
credit monitoring  
 
 
 
   
State average time in HOURS , spent for each 
trip to and from the borrower during credit 
monitoring 
    
State other costs(e.g, Lunch, allowances, 
stationery, drinks e.t.c)  in TSH,  for each trip 
to and from the borrower during credit 
monitoring 
    
State the amount of fees or tips for each trip 
in TSH 
    
State the costs normally incurred by your 
bank in measuring viability of each 
borrower’s activity/business, in TSH. 
    
Please state in TSH average costs normally 
incurred by your bank when any particular 
borrower breach credit contract 
    
In case of breach of credit contract by 
borrower. How much in TSH does your bank  
normally incur ( eg, Filing charges, lawyer’s 
charges, local government levies e.t.c) to file 
a case against such borrower 
    
At time when your bank use third parties eg, 
commission agents to enforce credit contracts 
against borrower. How  much on average 
does your bank incur in TSH to pay such a 
third party for each contract enforced 
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Please state any other costs, in relation to 
monitoring and enforcement of credit contract 
other than those above in TSH. (cost 
type)…………………………………. 
………………………………………. 
    
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
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Appendix  4:Measurement of Variables 
 
Most of items were quantified into monetary terms, in particular Tanzanian shillings. 
This includes those measured in kilometers/mileage, and in terms of hours, were 
converted into shillings, with exception to items which were quantified in attitudinal 
scale measurements. This approach was adopted from Williamson (2009), on his 
work on transaction costs analysis. 
ITEMS MEASUREMENT 
Distance Measured in Kilometers or mileages, then 
quantified into monetary terms or amount 
of money (Tsh) paid to credit officers as 
travelling expenses to visit borrowers, 
under given mileage  or Kilometers  
Reputation Social recognition, status and public 
image of borrowers(attitudinal 
measurement) 
Trust Past borrowing experiences and 
repayment tendency ofborrowers 
(attitudinal measurement) 
Loyalty Measurable through borrowers 
transaction frequencies, borrowers 
perception, feeling or recommendations 
towards the bank (attitudinal 
measurement) 
Time Measured in hours and quantified into 
monetary termsTsh through Minimum 
wage rate per hour under financial 
institutions in Tanzania 
Credit insurance policy Provisions made (premium) set aside by 
banks to cover uncertainties of any 
particular credit contract(Tsh) 
Credit/loan amount Amount of money given (lent) to 
borrowers(Tsh) 
Frustrations Un ethical/un acceptable borrowers 
behavior, particular for this case non 
repayment of credits by borrowers 
(attitudinal measurement) 
Contract drafting charges Money normally paid to lawyers by CBs 
for drafting any particular credit contract 
(Tsh) 
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Communication charges Amount of money paid to credit officers 
to facilitate communication with 
borrowers during searching of borrowers, 
negotiation of credit contracts or during 
or monitoring and enforcement of credit 
contracts(Tsh) 
Meetings facilitation charges Number of meetings and amount of 
money used by credit officers to facilitate 
meetings with borrowers(Tsh) until credit 
delivery 
Lawyer fees Amount of money normally paid to 
lawyers as fees for attesting any particular 
credit contracts (Tsh) 
Village government fees Charges in monetary terms normally paid 
as contribution to village government 
offices  when seeking borrower’s 
information(Tsh) 
Stakeholders fee (bribery) Tips and rewards required for lawful and 
legitimate services to be offered, 
quantified in monetary terms (Tsh) 
 
